The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
Abstract
The article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator. By auditing at a cost, however, the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm. If the regulator "finds" that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set, he can order a refund to consumers. In the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the audit finds that realized costs are lower than anticipated, given the original report. A separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision. The auditing decision, however, depends on the price that was initially set. The optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified. The methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable.
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Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Mangasarian, O. L. (1994) · Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics eBooks · doi:10.1137/1.9781611971255 · Cited by 3,220
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Self-citationUsing Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,206
A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
BARON, D. P. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x · Cited by 929
Self-citationThe Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
Mirrlees, J. A. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003192 · Cited by 870
Cited by
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261392 · Cited by 1,206
Log-concave probability and its applications
Bagnoli, M., & Bergstrom, T. (2006) · Studies in Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-29578-x_11 · Cited by 963
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
Border, K. C., & Sobel, J. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297481 · Cited by 332
Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526692 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P., & Besanko, D.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 447
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2055201271
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 22.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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