The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
Abstract
A model of the process by which players learn to play repeated coordination games is proposed with the goal of understanding the results of recent experiments. In those experiments, the dynamics of subjects' strategy choices and the resulting patterns of discrimination among equilibria varied systematically with the rule for determining payoffs and the size of the interacting groups in ways that are not adequately explained by available methods of analysis. The model suggests a possible explanation by showing how the dispersion of subjects' beliefs interacts with the learning process to determine the probability distribution of its dynamics and limiting outcome. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,673
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter
Fildes, R., Harvey, A. C., West, M., & Harrison, J. (1991) · The Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.2307/2583225 · Cited by 4,682
Theory and Practice of Recursive Identification
Lennart Ljung, A., & Söderström, T. (1983) · Lund University Publications (Lund University) · Cited by 3,989
Random perturbations of dynamical systems
(1997) · Translations of Mathematical Monographs · doi:10.1090/mmono/161/03 · Cited by 2,584
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Roth, A. E., & Erev, I. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80020-x · Cited by 1,678
Cited by
To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems
Hassin, R., & Haviv, M. (2003) · International Series in Operations Research & Management Science · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0 · Cited by 1,045
Organizational Learning from Performance Feedback: A Behavioral Perspective on Innovation and Change
Greve, H. R. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615139 · Cited by 771
Traders' Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence
Haruvy, E., Lahav, Y., & Noussair, C. N. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1901 · Cited by 398
Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups
Weber, R. A. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157588 · Cited by 238
Efficiency gains from team-based coordination-large-scale experimental evidence
Feri, F., Irlenbusch, B., & Sutter, M. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1892 · Cited by 98
Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V. P.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166644222
- Cited by
- 300
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 22.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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