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Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies a principal-agent relationship in which either the principal or a supervisor can monitor the agent's hidden action by the use of identical monitoring technologies. We assume that signals are private information and commitment to monitoring is not possible. We show that delegation of monitoring is profitable. With delegation the principal can better regulate incentives (incentive-effect) and commit to a broader range of wage structures (commitment-effect). We introduce collusion to find an endogenous bound on rewards and show that collusion limits the commitment-effect, but due to the incentive-effect delegation remains profitable.
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Citations
Cited by
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Hindriks, J., Keen, M., & Muthoo, A. (1999) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00030-4 · Cited by 400
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Cai, J., Eidam, F., Saunders, A., & Steffen, S. (2018) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2017.12.005 · Cited by 261
Strategic Opportunities in the Oversight of the U.S. Hospital Accreditation System
Moffett, M. L., Morgan, R. O., & Ashton, C. M. (2005) · Health Policy · doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2005.03.005 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Strausz, R.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2105525281
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Strausz, R. (1997). Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2971717
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.