The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corruption, extortion and evasion
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Citations
Cites
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Muthoo, A. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511607950 · Cited by 1,162
Self-citationCorruption, Public Investment, and Growth
Tanzi, V., Davoodi, H. R., VTanzi@imf.org, & HDavoodi@imf.org (1997) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451929515.001 · Cited by 737
Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives
Besley, T., & McLaren, J. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234340 · Cited by 579
Gray, C. W., & Kaufman, D. J. (1998) · Finance & development · doi:10.5089/9781451953220.022.a003 · Cited by 566
Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?
Mookherjee, D., & Png, I. P. L. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235324 · Cited by 503
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0 · Cited by 446
On the measurement of the degree of progression
Jakobsson, U. (1976) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90066-9 · Cited by 414
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
Border, K. C., & Sobel, J. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297481 · Cited by 332
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Auriol, E., 1996. Delegation under the threat of corruption in procurement and public purchase. University of Toulouse, mimeo.
- Chu, 1990, Income tax evasion with venal tax officials — the case of developing countries, Public Finance, 392
- Jain, 1997, Tax evasion, economic reforms and corruption in India, Intertax, 25, 18, 10.54648/TAXI1997006 · doi:10.54648/taxi1997006
- Kofman, 1993, Collusion in hierarchical agency, Econometrica, 61, 629, 10.2307/2951721 · doi:10.2307/2951721
- Mogiliansky, A., 1994. Corruption in procurement: the economics of regulatory blackmail. University of Stockholm, mimeo.
- Tirole, 1986, Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organisations, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2, 181
Cited by
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
Aidt, T. S. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00171.x · Cited by 1,192
Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis
Dreher, A., & Schneider, F. (2010) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9513-0 · Cited by 646
The Political Economy of Corruption
(2001) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203468388 · Cited by 563
How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?
Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C., & McCorriston, S. (2009) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1007/s10797-008-9089-5 · Cited by 421
Thomas, V., Dailimi, M., Dhareshwar, A., Kaufmann, D., Kishor, N., Lopez, R., & Wang, Y. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/0-1952-1593-1 · Cited by 356
Metadata
- Authors
- Hindriks, J., Keen, M., & Muthoo, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999-12
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 395-430
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035846455
- Cited by
- 400
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 25.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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- The paper
- Hindriks, J., Keen, M., & Muthoo, A. (1999). Corruption, extortion and evasion. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00030-4
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.