The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Truthful Disclosure of Information
Abstract
This article is about disclosure of quality. The question that it seeks to answer is: Does the free market offer enough incentive for business to disclose? The article concludes that whether information is of purely private value or not, more than the socially-optimal amount of disclosure takes place. The optimal policy is for the government to subsidize sale without disclosure. The article offers no support for the policy of mandatory disclosure. The results should be viewed with care, however, as they seem to depend on special features of the model, in particular the assumed impossibility of misrepresentation.
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
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Self-check
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Cited by
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. I. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.728545 · Cited by 441
Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything
Loewenstein, G., Sunstein, C. R., & Golman, R. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041341 · Cited by 280
Metadata
- Authors
- Jovanovic, B.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 36
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1528744990
- Cited by
- 521
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Truthful Disclosure of Information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003428
- The paper
- Jovanovic, B. (1982). Truthful Disclosure of Information. The Bell Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003428
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
