The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Truthful Disclosure of Information
Abstract
This article is about disclosure of quality. The question that it seeks to answer is: Does the free market offer enough incentive for business to disclose? The article concludes that whether information is of purely private value or not, more than the socially-optimal amount of disclosure takes place. The optimal policy is for the government to subsidize sale without disclosure. The article offers no support for the policy of mandatory disclosure. The results should be viewed with care, however, as they seem to depend on special features of the model, in particular the assumed impossibility of misrepresentation.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of Income
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University) · doi:10.7916/d8pg22pm · Cited by 1,353
Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids
GROSSMAN, S. J., & HART, O. D. (1980) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02161.x · Cited by 882
Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
Greenwald, B. C. N. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429023507 · Cited by 441
Johnson, W. R. (1978) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884162 · Cited by 409
A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation
Mazis, M. B., Staelin, R., Beales, H., & Salop, S. (1981) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224298104500102 · Cited by 87
Cited by
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00025-8 · Cited by 2,303
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2006) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505 · Cited by 1,426
The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards
Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303321675428 · Cited by 886
Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent
Wagenhofer, A. (1990) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(90)90020-5 · Cited by 760
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers
Jung, W.-O., & Kwon, Y. K. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491118 · Cited by 701
Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.3.479 · Cited by 515
VICTIMS AND SHAREHOLDERS: THE DILEMMAS OF PRESENTING CORPORATE POLICY DURING A CRISIS.
Marcus, A. A., & Goodman, R. S. (1991) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256443 · Cited by 499
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.006 · Cited by 460
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. I. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.728545 · Cited by 441
Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap
Gerarden, T. D., Newell, R. G., & Stavins, R. N. (2017) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20161360 · Cited by 398
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale
Shavell, S. (1994) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555851 · Cited by 316
Natural disasters, risk salience, and corporate ESG disclosure
Huang, Q., Li, Y., Lin, M., & McBrayer, G. A. (2022) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102152 · Cited by 304
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
Lewis, G. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1535 · Cited by 298
Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything
Loewenstein, G., Sunstein, C. R., & Golman, R. (2014) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041341 · Cited by 280
Anagol, S., Cole, S., & Sarkar, S. (2017) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00625 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Jovanovic, B.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 36
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1528744990
- Cited by
- 521
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.