The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Open accessAbstract
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment. When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individualistic reward structures; in the limit, as the number of contestants becomes large, expected utility may approach the first-best (perfect information) level. We study the design of contests, including the optimal use of prizes versus punishments and absolute versus relative performance standards. The analysis can also be viewed as a contribution to the multi-agent, single-principal problem.
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Cites
The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme
Hart, O. D. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003639 · Cited by 1,499
The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales
Akerlof, G. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885324 · Cited by 1,010
Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty
Mirrlees, J. A. (2006) · Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.003.0003 · Cited by 391
Information, Competition, and Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d83b6946 · Cited by 358
Self-citationIncentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy
Stiglitz, J. E. (1975) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003243 · Cited by 324
Self-citation“Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance,”
Varian, H. R. (1980) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(80)90004-3 · Cited by 321
Cited by
Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources
STEIN, J. C. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03810.x · Cited by 1,777
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
BROWN, K. C., HARLOW, W. V., & STARKS, L. T. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x · Cited by 1,485
Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices
GIROUD, X., & MUELLER, H. M. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01642.x · Cited by 1,167
Credit Markets and the Control of Capital
Stiglitz, J. E. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992329 · Cited by 1,090
Self-citationSOME LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE
Stiglitz, J. E. (1996) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/11.2.151 · Cited by 1,016
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Nalebuff, B. J., & Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 21
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4251781751
- Cited by
- 1,111
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 11.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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