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Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
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This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information. These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment. When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individualistic reward structures; in the limit, as the number of contestants becomes large, expected utility may approach the first-best (perfect information) level. We study the design of contests, including the optimal use of prizes versus punishments and absolute versus relative performance standards. The analysis can also be viewed as a contribution to the multi-agent, single-principal problem.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nalebuff, B. J., & Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 21
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4251781751
- Cited by
- 1,111
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 11.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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