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Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders
Abstract
This article shows that contracts which make workers' wages depend on their seniority level as well as their length of service can induce optimal turnover in the presence of transactions costs and investments in specific capital. Other arrangements which are shown to be inferior include Becker's standard sharing contract and contracts which embody explicit separation penalties. The optimal wage profile is derived and it corresponds to those we observe.
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Citations
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Wang, H. C., He, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2009) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.787 · Cited by 493
O rganizational P rospects, I nfluence C osts, and O wnership C hanges
Meyer, M., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1992) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00009.x · Cited by 485
A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
Gibbons, R., & Waldman, M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556287 · Cited by 460
Chapter 2 The theory of the firm
Holmstrom, B. R., & Tirole, J. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)01005-8 · Cited by 442
Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. J. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00064-4 · Cited by 342
Discretion and bias in performance evaluation
Prendergast, C., & Topel, R. (1993) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90024-5 · Cited by 291
The Economics of Private Sector Training: A Survey of the Literature
Leuven, E. (2005) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00240.x · Cited by 256
Metadata
- Authors
- Carmichael, L.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 251
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1552987106
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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