The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints
Abstract
Vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices, locations, and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price-mediated exchange of conventional markets. In this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints. In a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive, and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power, we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers' decisions. These externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform-price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits. We identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient, under various conditions, to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint-profit maximum.
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Cites
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance.
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Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods
Salop, S. C. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003323 · Cited by 2,975
Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy
Spengler, J. J. (1950) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256964 · Cited by 1,614
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
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A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly
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Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?
Telser, L. G. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466564 · Cited by 562
Friedman, M. (1962) · Cited by 411
Cited by
Bergen, M., Dutta, S., & Walker, O. C. (1992) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1177/002224299205600301 · Cited by 1,105
Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Abhishek, V., Jerath, K., & Zhang, Z. J. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230 · Cited by 1,082
Channel Dynamics Under Price and Service Competition
Tsay, A. A., & Agrawal, N. (2000) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2.4.372.12342 · Cited by 799
Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data
Berto Villas-Boas, S. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00433.x · Cited by 560
Channel Structures of Online Retail Platforms
Ha, A. Y., Tong, S., & Wang, Y. (2022) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2021.1011 · Cited by 443
Metadata
- Authors
- Mathewson, G. F., & Winter, R. A.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2063357317
- Cited by
- 488
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 19.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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