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Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
Abstract
This article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it. It is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion, and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way. Without enforceable contracts, the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment. Three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be Pareto-ranked from best to worst as follows: specific performance, expectation damages, and reliance damages.
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Citations
Cited by
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law
Schwartz, A., & Scott, R. E. (2003) · The Yale Law Journal · doi:10.2307/3657531 · Cited by 361
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Self-citationIncomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
Chung, T.-Y. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297950 · Cited by 290
Metadata
- Authors
- Rogerson, W. P.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2082521655
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003668
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- Rogerson, W. P. (1984). Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003668
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.