The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
Abstract
An optimal contract design problem is considered. Contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness. An optimal contract is characterized in two cases. First, when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk-neutral parties who must make relationship-specific investments, it is possible to implement the first-best by a simple contract. Second, when a contract is being used to share risk, it is generally not possible to implement the first-best. When one party is risk neutral, however, it is possible to implement the first-best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party.
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Citations
Cites
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
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Bengtsson, N. (2015) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.02.003 · Cited by 14
Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi
Telalagic, S. (2012) · Faculty of Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.1021 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Chung, T.-Y.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-10
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1031
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2027395801
- Cited by
- 290
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 6.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Chung, T.-Y. (1991). Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297950
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
