Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 199

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

The Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic Leaders: A Missing Piece of the Representative Bureaucracy Puzzle

Riccucci, Norma M., Saidel, Judith R.·1997·Public Administration Review

Abstract

A long tradition of research in public administration revolves around the concept of representative bureaucracy (e.g., Krislov, 1974; Grabosky and Rosenbloom, 1975; Thompson, 1976; Cayer and Sigelman, 1980; Dometrius, 1984; Meier, 1993a; see also Meier, 1993b, for a comprehensive review of representative bureaucracy theory and research). According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, the demographic composition of the bureaucracy should mirror the demographic composition of the public. In this way, the preferences of a heterogeneous population will be represented in bureaucratic decision making. The theory has been more precisely defined in recent years to include the following types of representation: passive, where the bureaucracy has the same demographic origins as the population it serves, and active, where bureaucrats act on behalf of their counterparts in the general population. Active representativeness theory holds that values linked to demographic origins will be translated into programs, policies, or decisions that benefit individuals of similar origins (Meier, 1993b). Initially, representative bureaucracy theory generated a good deal of controversy because the notion of a public bureaucracy acting as a representative political institution was considered a perversion of democratic rule (Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981). Despite these early challenges, the theory has gained considerable attention as a legitimation for bureaucratic policy making and as a justification for social policies such as affirmative action (Saltzstein, 1979; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh, 1977). The preponderance of representative bureaucracy research has focused on the demographic representativeness of public bureaucracies, an issue that remains salient not only to researchers but also to elected officials with appointing authority.(1) The composition of government work forces is illustrative of the level of openness of bureaucracies to persons of all backgrounds (Meier, 1993b). It serves as an indicator of equality of opportunity and access. In addition, it can promote the legitimacy of government bureaucracies in that diverse communities may have a greater sense of enfranchisement when the bureaucracies that serve them (e.g., police, health, social services, etc.) are visibly diverse. In these ways, passive representativeness has important symbolic value. Our research joins the debate as to where the study of representative bureaucracy should be concentrated. We depart from previous research by focusing on agency leaders, as opposed to overall agencies or bureaucrats. Top political appointees serve as our locus of representativeness. Many scholars and practitioners have argued that representation is important not just at the upper, policy-making levels, but at the lower levels as well (Meier 1993b; Meier and Stewart, 1992; Thompson 1976). The interest is in street-level bureaucrats, a term coined by Lipsky (1980), which refers to those direct service providers (e.g., police officers, social workers) who have some discretion over the delivery of public services in their domains. In representative bureaucracy parlance, bureaucrats are an important cohort of public employees because they have the power to influence the quality and quantity of services their agencies deliver. While many have acknowledged the significance of bureaucrats as agency representatives (e.g., Thompson, 1976), few have contested the importance of agency leaders as pivotal bureaucratic decision makers. Policy leaders appointed by governors are an integral part of the policy-making machinery of state government. As the pace of devolution accelerates, political appointees will exercise substantial influence over policy development and participate in key resource allocation choices. This study supplies a missing piece of the representative bureaucracy puzzle in that it focuses on the most influential policy makers. …

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/3109988

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 199

Metadata

Authors
Riccucci, N. M., & Saidel, J. R.
Venue
Public Administration Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1997-09
Volume
57
Issue
5
Pages
423
ISSN
0033-3352 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1999461840
Cited by
199
References
0
FWCI
9.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic Leaders: A Missing Piece of the Representative Bureaucracy Puzzle. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3109988
The paper
Riccucci, N. M., & Saidel, J. R. (1997). The Representativeness of State-Level Bureaucratic Leaders: A Missing Piece of the Representative Bureaucracy Puzzle. Public Administration Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/3109988

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.