The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Firms Want to Organize Efficiently and what Keeps Them from Doing So: Inappropriate Governance, Performance, and Adaptation in a Deregulated Industry
Abstract
This paper integrates content-based predictions of transaction cost economics with process-based predictions of organizational change to understand adaptation to deregulation in the for-hire trucking industry. We predict and find that firms whose governance of a core transaction is poor (according to transaction cost reasoning) will realize lower profits than their better-aligned counterparts and that these firms will attempt to adapt so as to better align their transactions. Results show that several organizational features affect the rate of adaptation: (1) firms with large investments in specialized assets adapt less readily than firms that rely on generic assets, (2) firms with unions adapt less readily than firms without unions, (3) firms that must replace employee drivers with owner-operators adapt less readily than firms that must replace owner-operators with employee drivers, and (4) entrants adapt more quickly than incumbent carriers. There is evidence of institutional isomorphism in that although carriers move systematically to reduce misalignment, they do so less assiduously when this will make their governance of drivers look less like that of nearby, similar carriers. Finally, our results indicate that firms that ultimately exited adapted more quickly than firms that survived.
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Cites
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Cited by
Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization
Santos, F. M., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2005) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1050.0152 · Cited by 1,033
Make, Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.21794670 · Cited by 928
Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: transactions, resources, and institutions
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Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences
Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008) · Business and Politics · doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1210 · Cited by 535
Metadata
- Authors
- Nickerson, J. A., & Silverman, B. S.
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 433-465
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W2125381863
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 11.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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