Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses
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Abstract
For decades, practitioners and academic commentators who believe that target boards should have broad discretion to resist hostile takeover attempts have put forward the “bargaining power hypothesis” to support their view. This hypothesis states that a target with strong takeover defenses will extract more in a negotiated acquisition than a target with weaker defenses, because the acquirer’s no-deal alternative, to make a hostile bid, is less attractive against a strong-defense target. The hypothesis helped usher in the modern era of takeover defenses: In endorsing the poison pill in Moran v. Household International, Inc., the Delaware
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Cited by
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Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
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Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006 · Cited by 986
BOONE, A. L., & MULHERIN, J. H. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01225.x · Cited by 534
Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers
Cain, M. D., McKeon, S. B., & Solomon, S. D. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003 · Cited by 392
Bargaining power and industry dependence in mergers
Ahern, K. R. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.09.003 · Cited by 272
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Kamar, E., Karaca-Mandic, P., & Talley, E. (2007) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewn019 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- Subramanian, G.
- Venue
- The Yale Law Journal
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 621
- ISSN
- 0044-0094 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122261088
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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