The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?
Abstract
CEOs receive preferential treatment, at the expense of shareholders, when corporate insiders are included on the compensation committee. While CEO compensation is not greater, the relation between CEO compensation and corporate performance is more favorable to the CEO with insiders on the compensation committee when corporate performance is poor.
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Citations
Cites
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
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Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,936
The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00809.x · Cited by 1,842
Executive compensation and corporate governance in China
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006 · Cited by 592
Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence
Vafeas, N. (2003) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/1468-5957.05525 · Cited by 571
Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview
Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008) · Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal · doi:10.1108/09513570810907401 · Cited by 538
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
MORSE, A., NANDA, V., & SERU, A. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x · Cited by 432
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. T. (2011) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x · Cited by 403
Anderson, R. C., & Bizjak, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(02)00259-5 · Cited by 305
Women’s Roles on U.S. Fortune 500 Boards: Director Expertise and Committee Memberships
Peterson, C. A., & Philpot, J. (2007) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-006-9164-8 · Cited by 296
Corporate governance: measurement and determinant analysis
Khanchel, I. (2007) · Managerial Auditing Journal · doi:10.1108/02686900710819625 · Cited by 278
Appuhami, R., & Bhuyan, M. (2015) · Managerial Auditing Journal · doi:10.1108/maj-04-2014-1022 · Cited by 100
Metadata
- Authors
- Newman, H. A., & Mozes, H. A.
- Venue
- Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 28
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 41
- ISSN
- 0046-3892 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2001413637
- Cited by
- 204
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.