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Cited by 215

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Wealth

Open access
Walker, M. Mark·2000·Financial Management

Abstract

I investigate the strategic objectives and stock price performance of acquiring firms. The results support both the asymmetric information hypothesis (acquiring-firm shareholders earn higher returns following cash offers) and also the strategic alignment hypothesis (acquiring-firm shareholders earn higher returns following takeovers that expand the firm’s operations geographically or increase its market share). Further analysis shows that shareholder losses are limited primarily to those takeovers based on diversification strategies, when the acquiring firm cites potential overlap with its existing operations. The latter firms tend to have more favorable growth opportunities prior to the takeover announcement.

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Metadata

Authors
Walker, M. M.
Venue
Financial Management
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2000
Volume
29
Issue
1
Pages
53
ISSN
0046-3892 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2015621243
Cited by
215
References
2
FWCI
15.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Wealth. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3666361
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Walker, M. M. (2000). Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Wealth. Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.2307/3666361

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.