Lessons from Everest: The Interaction of Cognitive Bias, Psychological Safety, and System Complexity
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many participants and observers have analyzed the 1996 Mount Everest tragedy and blamed a host of factors including the weather, equipment failures, and human error. This article examines the people and events through three theoretical lenses: behavioral decision theory, group dynamics, and complex systems. Factors at each level—individual, group, and organizational system—interacted with one another to cause the tragedy. This analysis provides a framework for understanding and diagnosing largescale organizational failures, and it provides several important lessons for managers making and implementing high-stakes decisions within organizations.
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Citations
Cites
Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams
Edmondson, A. (1999) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2666999 · Cited by 12,026
Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256434 · Cited by 3,818
Amason, A. C. (1996) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256633 · Cited by 2,584
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4 · Cited by 2,573
Conflict and Strategic Choice: How Top Management Teams Disagree
Eisenhardt, K. M., Kahwajy, J. L., & Bourgeois, L. J. (1997) · California Management Review · doi:10.2307/41165886 · Cited by 370
Cited by
Psychological safety: a systematic review of the literature
Newman, A., Donohue, R., & Eva, N. (2017) · Human Resource Management Review · doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2017.01.001 · Cited by 1,408
Strategic flexibility:Organizational preparedness to reverse ineffective strategic decisions
Shimizu, K., & Hitt, M. A. (2004) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/ame.2004.15268683 · Cited by 479
Groupthink in temporary organizations
Hällgren, M. (2010) · International Journal of Managing Projects in Business · doi:10.1108/17538371011014044 · Cited by 47
“Several of the survivors from the fatal 1996 climb have documented their experiences (Boukreev and Dewalt, 1998; Breashears, 1999; Krakauer, 1997; Weathers, 2000) and the events have subsequently been subject to extensive academic interest (Elmes and Barry, 1999; Elmes and Frame, 2008; Hällgren, 2007; Kayes, 2002, 200…”
BackgroundMethodLeadership in extreme contexts: A groupthink analysis of the May 1996 Mount Everest disaster
Burnette, J. L., Pollack, J. M., & Forsyth, D. R. (2011) · Journal of Leadership Studies · doi:10.1002/jls.20190 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Roberto, M. A.
- Venue
- California Management Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 136-158
- ISSN
- 0008-1256 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-8564
- OpenAlex
- W2004991708
- Cited by
- 133
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Roberto, M. A. (2002). Lessons from Everest: The Interaction of Cognitive Bias, Psychological Safety, and System Complexity. California Management Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/41166157
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.