Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 1×
“Toehold ownership in the target as a determinant of the success of a takeover as well as the price at which the takeover succeeds has received considerable attention in the literature (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990), Walkling (1985), and Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992)).”
BackgroundThe Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 2×
“Theorists modeling product markets argue that the desire to build a good reputation provides a firm that offers high quality goods with the incentive to continue providing these high quality products (Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen (1984)).”
BackgroundPremiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Cited by
When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As
GOLUBOV, A., PETMEZAS, D., & TRAVLOS, N. G. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01712.x · Cited by 381
Metadata
- Authors
- Kale, J. R., Kini, O., & Ryan, H. E.
- Venue
- The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 475
- ISSN
- 0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167960307
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 9.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/4126728
- The paper
- Kale, J. R., Kini, O., & Ryan, H. E. (2003). Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. https://doi.org/10.2307/4126728
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.