Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 191

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984

Remmer, Karen L.·1986·Comparative Politics

Abstract

During the late 1970s authoritarian rule in Latin America began to give way to processes of political liberalization and democratization. The debt crisis of the early 1980s accelerated this trend. Under the weight of crippling external financial obligations, the region slid into its worst recession since the 1930s. Widespread unemployment, plummeting living standards, acute shortages of foreign exchange, declining investment, and severe inflation all magnified the vulnerabilities and contradictions of authoritarianism. By 1985 elected governments had displaced military regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay. Among those countries with some prior democratic experience, only Chile resisted the continentwide shift away from authoritarian rule. For participants and outside observers alike, the key question raised by these developments was the viability of liberal democracy under conditions of economic austerity. Circumstances that favor regime emergence are not necessarily conducive to regime consolidation, and in the case of Latin America it became immediately apparent that the economic crisis undermining authoritarianism also reduced prospects for the consolidation of democratic institutions. As a variety of analysts have suggested, economic growth creates conditions conducive to political compromise, but when the economic pie is shrinking, conflict and opposition tend to mount.' The problem confronting Latin American democracies during the 1980s, however, has not been simply that of survival in the face of economic decline. To retain access to international financial markets, governments throughout the region have been forced to adopt politically painful stabilization measures involving currency devaluations, wage and credit restrictions, and strict fiscal controls. Most observers have questioned the willingness and capacity of democratic leaders to implement such measures, despite the obvious costs of failure and the absence of viable policy alternatives. According to conventional wisdom, stabilization policies pose such unacceptably high political risks for democratic governments in Latin America that authoritarianism is virtually a prerequisite for successful adjustment.2 The purpose of this study is to reexamine this conventional wisdom regarding the politics of economic stabilization. Does the historical record sustain the view that Latin American democracies are singularly ill-equipped to manage programs designed to correct serious and persistent balance-of-payments deficits? Do conventional stabilization policies carry higher political risks for democratic governments than for authoritarian ones? How have the trade-offs between coercion and consent affected the relative capacity of military and democratic governments to impose stabilization measures? Under what conditions, if any, has democratic rule produced successful stabilization and authoritarianism resulted in failure? The answers to such questions are not only central to theoretical debates over the

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/421778

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 191

Metadata

Authors
Remmer, K. L.
Venue
Comparative Politics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1986-10
Volume
19
Issue
1
Pages
1
ISSN
0010-4159 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2314860933
Cited by
191
References
0
FWCI
15.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/421778
The paper
Remmer, K. L. (1986). The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954-1984. Comparative Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/421778

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.