The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94
Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on divided government and legislative productivity. We begin by reexamining Mayhew's data on landmark enactments. We show that Mayhew's claim that divided government does not affect legislative productivity is a consequence of aggregating time series that exhibit different behavior. We then extend Mayhew's analysis by broadening the concept of significance and creating a new four-category measure that encompasses all 17,663 public laws enacted in the period of 1945-94. Using appropriate time-series techniques, we demonstrate that periods of divided government depress the production of landmark legislation by about 30%, at least when productivity is measured on the basis of contemporaneous perceptions of legislative significance. Divided government, however, has no substantive effect on the production of important, albeit not landmark, legislation and actually has a positive effect on the passage of trivial laws.
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CLINTON, J., JACKMAN, S., & RIVERS, D. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001194 · Cited by 1,153
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791123 · Cited by 1,134
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?
Anzia, S. F., & Berry, C. R. (2011) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x · Cited by 468
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
BERRY, C. R., BURDEN, B. C., & HOWELL, W. G. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000377 · Cited by 377
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C., & Riemann, C.
- Venue
- Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 285
- ISSN
- 0362-9805 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2054686101
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 19.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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