The DOI matches its Crossref record; 171 of the 171 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Abstract
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
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Cites
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Cited by
Political Polarization in the American Public
Fiorina, M. P., & Abrams, S. J. (2008) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836 · Cited by 1,881
Monroe, B. L., Colaresi, M. P., & Quinn, K. M. (2008) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpn018 · Cited by 542
Legislative Voting and Accountability
Carey, J. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810077 · Cited by 466
Causes and Consequences of Polarization
Barber, M. J., & McCarty, N. (2015) · Solutions to Political Polarization in America · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316091906.002 · Cited by 375
Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics
LAYMAN, G. C., CARSEY, T. M., GREEN, J. C., HERRERA, R., & COOPERMAN, R. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305541000016x · Cited by 348
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2006-03-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 07
- Pages
- 43-4315-43-4315
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1536322546
- Cited by
- 910
- References
- 171
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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