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Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context

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Wiener, Jonathan Baert · 1999 · The Yale Law Journal

Abstract

A central issue in environmental law is the choice among regulatory instruments. From Pigou to Coase to the present, scholars have debated the relative merits of liability rules, property rules, technology standards, taxes, subsidies, and tradeable allowances. An emerging scholarly consensus in economics and law would crown taxes as the presumptive optimal instrument for controlling environmental externalities. But this debate has largely been confined to the context of national law. This article examines the choice of regulatory instruments at the global level--the Olympics of instrument choice. It contends that the choice of optimal regulatory instrument is contingent on the underlying legal system of the regulatory polity. The article focuses on two salient dimensions of variation across legal systems; the voting rule for adoption of law, and the implementation structure for execution of law. The economics literature on instrument choice typically assumes that the regulator wields automatic fiat and unitary implementation. National regulatory legislation is generally adopted under a majoritarian voting rule which can compel sources of externalities to comply, and executed through a federalist structure which can impose constraints directly on sources. By contrast, global regulatory treaties are generally adopted under a voluntary assent voting rule which requires source countries to choose to participate, and executed through a jurisdictional structure which requires regulation to be implemented by nation-state intermediaries. The article argues that the fundamental differences along these two dimensions between the national and global legal systems--voting rules and implementation structures--make tradeable allowances, not taxes, the presumptive first choice for environmental protection at the global level. The article shows that the voluntary assent voting rule for international treaty law necessitates side payments to engage reluctant sources of externalities--a beneficiaries pay rather than a pay approach. And it shows that making such side payments is more under tradeable allowances than under taxes, where participation efficiency is defined as minimizing the sum of the costs of securing participation (which include not only out-of-pocket costs but also the moral hazard distortions induced by subsidizing or compensating polluters for the costs of abatement) plus the costs of enduring nonparticipation (which include leakage of the externality-generating activities from regulated to unregulated jurisdictions). The article argues that when participation must be secured rather than coerced, side payments can be made in a more participation efficient manner alongside tradeable allowances than alongside other instruments. In addition, the article shows that implementation by nation-states makes taxes more costly to monitor than tradeable allowances. In concert, these two legal system variables counsel selection of tradeable allowances, not taxes or command-and-control technology standards, to address global environmental problems such as greenhouse warming and biodiversity loss. More generally, the article argues that whether the regulatory polity is the entire planet or a local neighborhood, the prevailing voting rule and implementation structure will powerfully affect the relative merits of regulatory instruments, and that the debate over instrument choice needs to be reconceived with more explicit attention to the assumed underlying legal framework. Indeed, the article suggests that a key explanation for the divergence between the Pigouvian and Coasean approaches is the assumed underlying legal system. The article seeks to demonstrate that in the design of international regulatory law, economics matters; and, at the same time, that in the economics of regulatory design, law matters.

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Metadata

Authors
Wiener, J. B.
Venue
The Yale Law Journal
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1999-01
Volume
108
Issue
4
Pages
677
ISSN
0044-0094 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1528805629
Cited by
228
References
0
FWCI
102.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/797394
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Wiener, J. B. (1999). Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context. The Yale Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/797394

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