Mao's China and the Cold War

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In the first minute of the 23 August 1958 barrage, some 2,600 rounds were fired.

“In the first minute, some 2,600 rounds were fired.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Consequently, in summer 1958, Mao and the CCP leadership, formally announcing that 'the realization of a Communist society in China is not far away,' unleashed the Great Leap Forward throughout China's cities and countryside.

“Consequently, in summer 1958, Mao and the ccp leadership, formally announcing that ''the realization of a Communist society in China is not far away,'' unleashed the Great Leap Forward throughout China's cities and countryside.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mao's decision to postpone the shelling operation confused some of his own commanders.

“Mao's decision to postpone the shelling operation, however, also confused some of his own commanders.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Mao stressed that the purpose of the shelling operation was to demand that American armed forces withdraw from Taiwan and Jiang's troops withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu, and if they did not, China would attack.

“In elaborating what he saw as the purpose of the shelling operation, the chairman stressed: ''Our demand is that American armed forces withdraw from Taiwan, and Jiang's troops withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they do not do so, we will attack.”

May combine two claims.

When top CCP leaders met in Chengdu in March 1958, Mao announced that he had not been personally involved in military decision making since the Korean War and that 'this year I will come back to do some military [commanding] work.'

“When top ccp leaders met in Chengdu in March, Mao announced that he had not been personally involved in military decision making since the Korean War and that ''this year I will come back to do some military [commanding] work.'' 56”

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May combine two claims.

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, and Truman's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would enter the Taiwan Strait to neutralize the area, completely changed the strategic scenario in East Asia.

“The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, as well as President Harry Truman's subsequent announcement that the Seventh Fleet would enter the Taiwan Strait to neutralize this area, completely changed the strategic scenario in East Asia.”

May combine two claims.

Although Mao had actively considered 'taking major military actions' in the Taiwan Strait since early 1958, not until July did he decide to conduct large-scale shelling of the Jinmen islands.

“Although Mao had actively considered ''taking major military actions'' in the Taiwan Strait since early 1958,70 not until July did he decide to conduct large-scale shelling of the Jinmen islands.”

• cites [70]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mao clarified that he intended to take over Jinmen, although not necessarily through a landing operation.

“He also clarified that he intended to take over Jinmen, although not necessarily through a landing operation.”

May combine two claims.

In the six weeks following 23 August 1958, PLA artillery bombardment continued, and several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on Jinmen and surrounding waters.

“In the ensuing six weeks, the pla's artillery bombardment continued, and several hundred thousand artillery shells exploded on the Jinmen islands and in the waters around them.”

May combine two claims.

In a general sense, Mao did not believe that Washington would intervene militarily for the sake of Jinmen and other GMD-controlled offshore islands; nor did he anticipate that the shelling on Jinmen would result in a general war between China and the United States.

“In a general sense, Mao did not believe that Washington would intervene militarily for the sake of Jinmen and other gmd-controlled offshore islands; nor did he anticipate that the shelling on Jinmen would result in a general war between China and the United States.93”

• cites [93]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

In protest against the Nagasaki flag incident, Beijing decided to cancel all of China's trade and cultural exchanges with Japan, which led to further erosion of Beijing's already highly strained relations with Japan.

“In protest, Beijing decided to cancel all of China's trade and cultural exchanges with Japan, which led to further erosion of Beijing's already highly”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mao made it clear that the shelling's main goal was to isolate the GMD troops on Jinmen, cutting them off from supplies.

“He also made it clear that the shelling's main goal was to isolate the gmd troops on Jinmen, cutting them off from supplies.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Mao believed that international tension, though a bad thing, had a good side: it would awaken many people and make them determined to fight against the imperialists.

“While ''international tension is certainly a bad thing, there is a good side of it: it will bring about the awakening of many people, and will make them determined to fight against the imperialists.'' 101”

• cites [101]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

About 600 GMD officers and soldiers were reportedly killed in the 23 August 1958 shelling, including three deputy commanders of the GMD's Jinmen garrison.

“About 600 gmd officers and soldiers were reportedly killed, among whom were three deputy commanders of the gmd's Jinmen garrison.2”

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mao claimed that Jinmen and Taiwan, like many other places where the United States had military bases, were 'nooses' for the United States.

“Within this context, the chairman claimed that Jinmen and Taiwan, like many other places in the world where the United States had military bases, were ''nooses'' for the United States:”

• cites [120]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

When Ye Fei ordered firing, he found he only needed to deal with the GMD because all American ships were staying at least three miles offshore to avoid exchanges with the PLA's shore batteries.

“When he ordered firing, to his surprise, he found he only needed to deal with the gmd because all American ships were staying at least three miles offshore to avoid exchanges with the pla's shore batteries.”

• cites [138]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Zhou advised that only if Washington used larger nuclear weapons and risked broadening the war should the Soviet Union respond with a nuclear counterstrike.

“Only if Washington resorted to using ''larger nuclear weapons'' and risked broadening the war ''should the Soviet Union respond with a nuclear counterstrike.''”

• cites [129]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Mao pointed out that now was the time to turn Jinmen into a 'noose' for Washington by not landing on Jinmen but putting more pressure on the Americans.

“Regarding Beijing's future strategy,Mao pointed out that nowwas the time to turn Jinmen into a ''noose'' for Washington by not landing on Jinmen but putting more pressure on the Americans.”

• cites [119]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

From Mao's perspective, his initiation and management of the 1958 crisis remained a successful case of promoting domestic mobilization by provoking international tension.

“However, from Mao's perspective, his initiation and management of the crisis remained a successful case of promoting domestic mobilization by provoking international tension.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In Mao's opinion, the best way to deal with the Americans at the moment was to keep them guessing.

“In the chairman's opinion, the best way to deal with the Americans at the moment was to keep them guessing.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The order instructed PLA artillery units on the Xiamen front to conduct another punitive barrage on important GMD military targets at Jinmen, accurate and fierce, with a scale larger than that of 23 August and a plan to fire about 300,000 rounds.

“(1) Our artillery units on the Xiamen front should conduct another punitive barrage on important gmd military targets at Jinmen. The strike should be both accurate and fierce. The scale of the barrage should be larger than that of 23 August with a plan to fire about 300,000 rounds.”

• cites [136]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

After more than two months, the PLA stopped regular and intensive shelling on Jinmen, and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 came to an end.

“After more than two months, the pla stopped regular and intensive shelling on Jinmen, and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 finally came to an end.”

May combine two claims.

Zhou promised that Beijing would take full responsibility for its own behavior and would not 'drag the Soviet Union into the water' if 'big trouble' resulted from the shelling.

“In particular, Zhou promised that Beijing would take full responsibility for its own behavior and would not ''drag the Soviet Union into the water'' if ''big trouble'' resulted from the shelling.”

• cites [124]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Mao told the meeting that although the PLA had fired dozens of thousands of rounds on Jinmen, he only meant to probe the Americans' intention and would not say whether the PLA would land on Jinmen.

“''In reality,'' commented the chairman, ''although we have fired dozens of thousands of rounds on Jinmen, we only mean to probe [the Americans' intention]. We will not say if we are, or if we are not, going to land on Jinmen. We will be doubly cautious and will act in accordance with the situation.''”

May combine two claims.

Zhou Enlai stated that Beijing would distinguish between the international dispute between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait and the internal matter of the Chinese people's efforts to liberate Taiwan, and thus was willing to sit down at the negotiation table with the Americans to discuss relaxing and eliminating tension in the Taiwan Strait.

“But Zhou also stated that Beijing would make a distinction between the ''international dispute between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait'' and the ''internal matter of the Chinese people's efforts to liberate Taiwan,'' and thus was willing to ''sit down at the negotiation table with the Americans to discuss how to relax and eliminate the tension in the Taiwan Strait.''”

• cites [121]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Zhou commented that the second option should be best for Jiang, since GMD troops on the offshore islands accounted for almost one-third of Jiang's whole military strength, and by withdrawing them back to Taiwan, Jiang would have more capital to bargain with the Americans.

“Zhou commented that the second option should be the best for Jiang, since the gmd troops on the offshore islands accounted for almost one-third of Jiang's whole military strength, and ''by withdrawing them back to Taiwan, Jiang will have more capital to bargain with the Americans.''”

• cites [145]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Zhou Enlai's comprehensive plan for struggling against the United States delighted Mao, who praised it and instructed its immediate implementation.

“Zhou's new plans delighted Mao. The chairman immediately wrote to the premier, praising these plans as ''very good indeed'' since they ''will allow us to gain the initiative.''”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

According to Zhou Enlai, the declaration of the twelve-mile territorial water limit was made at that particular moment to prevent American military vessels from coming close to the Jinmen islands, which were situated well within the twelve-mile zone.

“In Zhou Enlai's words, this declaration was made at this particular moment to ''prevent American military vessels from coming close to the Jinmen islands, which were situated well within the twelve-mile zone of China's territorial water.''”

• cites [115]Not matched

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The meeting participants concluded that although the Americans certainly would help the GMD defend Taiwan, it was doubtful they would help defend Jinmen and Mazu as well.

“The meeting participants concluded that although the Americans certainly would help the gmd defend Taiwan, it was doubtful that they would help defend Jinmen and Mazu as well.”

• cites [118]Not matched

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Zhou emphasized that by shelling Jinmen, Beijing meant to have the Americans 'get stuck' in Taiwan, just as they had 'gotten stuck' in the Middle East and Near East.

“Zhou emphasized that by shelling Jinmen, Beijing meant to have the Americans ''get stuck'' in Taiwan, ''just as they have 'gotten stuck' in the Middle East and Near East.''”

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The quote only partly states this claim.

In his speeches of 5 and 8 September, Mao repeatedly stressed that international tension was more a 'good thing' than a 'bad thing' because it would help mobilize the people both in China and in the world.

“The chairman repeatedly stressed that international tension was more a ''good thing'' than a ''bad thing'' because it would help mobilize the people both in China and in the world”

• cites [120]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Although the Soviet Union was China's most important ally in the 1950s, Mao intentionally kept the Soviet leaders in the dark about the timing, course, and purpose of his actions against Taiwan.

“Although the Soviet Union was China's most important ally in the 1950s, Mao intentionally kept the Soviet leaders in the dark about the timing, course, and purpose of his actions against Taiwan.”

May combine two claims.

On [blank] September, Beijing formally established the PRC's territorial waters at twelve nautical miles and declared that no foreign military aircraft or naval vessels would be allowed to cross the boundary without Beijing's permission.

“On September, Beijing formally established the prc's territorial waters at twelve nautical miles and declared that no foreign military aircraft or naval vessels would be allowed to cross the boundary without Beijing's permission.”

• cites [114]Not matched

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

According to Gromyko, Mao stated that if the Americans invaded the Chinese mainland or used nuclear weapons, Chinese forces would retreat, drawing American ground forces into China's interior.

“The Chinese chairman, according to Gromyko, stated that if the Americans were to invade the Chinese mainland or to use nuclear weapons, the Chinese forces would retreat, drawing American ground forces into China's interior.”

• cites [130]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Mao proposed leaving Jinmen and Mazu in Jiang Jieshi's hands, and at his urging the politburo agreed to adopt this policy so that the offshore islands might be turned into a burden for the Americans.

“At this point, Mao asked a crucial question: ''How about leaving Jinmen and Mazu in Jiang Jieshi's hands?''”

• Also stated in: § 198 beijing and t e taiwan strait crisis · plain

  “At Mao's urging, the politburo agreed to adopt this new policy of ''leaving Jinmen in Jiang's hand,'' so that the offshore islands might be ''turned into a burden for the Americans.''”

May combine two claims.

Zhou Enlai found the Fujian plan to escalate military operations against Jinmen inappropriate, and Mao approved Zhou's letter, commenting that his opinions were all correct.

“When the plan was submitted to Beijing for approval, Zhou found it inappropriate.”

• Also stated in: § 196 beijing and t e taiwan strait crisis · plain

  “Mao approvedZhou's letter as soon as he read it. The chairman commented that the premier's opinions about operations in Jinmen were ''all correct, as they will allow us to occupy an unbeatable position while at the same time completely holding the initiative.''”

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

On 6 October 1958, Beijing stopped all regular radio broadcasts to deliver a 'Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan' drafted by Mao, announcing that beginning that day, on condition of no American escorts, the PLA would suspend shelling on Jinmen for seven days.

“beginning on 6 October, on the condition of ''no American escorts,'' the pla would suspend shelling on Jinmen for seven days so as to allow supplies to be ''freely delivered'' to the islands.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The development of Beijing's Taiwan policy from 1949 to 1958 can be divided into four distinctive phases.

“The development of Beijing's Taiwan policy from 19 9 to 1958 can be divided into four distinctive phases.”

May combine two claims.

Beijing's decision to shell Jinmen was made not only to punish the GMD's lack of interest in the CCP's peace initiative or to probe Washington's intention in East Asia but also, and more importantly, to promote the extraordinary revolutionary outburst in China in 1958.

“Mao's statement is telling because it reveals that Beijing's decision to shell Jinmen was made not only to punish the gmd's lack of interest in the ccp's peace initiative or to probe Washington's intention in East Asia but also, and more importantly, to promote the extraordinary revolutionary outburst in China in 1958.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

According to Mao, the final goal of his revolution was the transformation of China's old state and society and the reassertion of China's central position in world affairs.

“According to Mao, the final goal of his revolution was the transformation of China's old state and society and the reassertion of China's central position in world affairs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Mao had a profound 'postrevolution anxiety.'

“In order to fully comprehend the implications of Maoist rhetoric concerning China's security status, we must understand Mao's profound ''postrevolution anxiety.''”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

These developments did not come as a surprise to Mao, since one of his main purposes was to stir up international tension on his own terms.

“These developments did not come as a surprise to Mao, since one of his main purposes was to stir up international tension on his own terms.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Given the revolutionary atmosphere prevailing in Chinese society in 1958, it would have been inconceivable for Mao not to make Taiwan an outstanding security issue.

“In retrospect, given the revolutionary atmosphere prevailing in Chinese society in 1958, it would have been inconceivable for Mao not to make Taiwan an outstanding security issue.”

May combine two claims.

Mao understood that the American military presence in the Taiwan Strait made it impossible for Beijing to 'liberate Taiwan' through military means and that it would be necessary to deal with the Americans at the negotiation table.

“He understood that the American military presence in the Taiwan Strait made it impossible for Beijing to ''liberate Taiwan'' through military means and that it would be necessary to deal with the Americans at the negotiation table.”

May combine two claims.

Mao knew that profound differences in opinion existed between Taipei and Washington, so he believed it possible to 'persuade' the Americans to force the GMD to withdraw from Jinmen and other offshore islands.

“He also knew that profound differences in opinion existed between Taipei and Washington, so he believed it possible to ''persuade'' the Americans to force the gmd to withdraw from Jinmen and other offshore islands.”

• cites [144]Not matched

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May combine two claims.

Mao's insistence that the PLA avoid hitting American ships reflected both his caution in dealing with Washington in a military situation and the emergence of a new focus in Beijing's management of the Taiwan crisis: while seizure of Jinmen and other offshore islands remained a key goal, his main attention had moved from the military conflict in Jinmen to the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in

“Mao's insistence that the pla avoid hitting American ships reflected not only his caution in dealing with Washington in a military situation but also the emergence of a new focus in Beijing's management of the Taiwan crisis: while the seizure of Jinmen and other offshore islands remained one of Mao's key goals, his main attention had moved from the military conflict in Jinmen to the Sino-American”

May combine two claims.

These two points represented a major concession on Beijing's part because, if Washington accepted them, Beijing would be obliged to give up use of force as a means to liberate Taiwan.

“These two points represented a major concession on Beijing's part because, if Washington accepted them, Beijing would be obliged to give up use of force as a means to liberate Taiwan.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The timing of Zhou's statement was probably related to a secret visit to Beijing by Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.

“The timing of Zhou's statement was probably related to a secret visit to Beijing by the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.”

May combine two claims.

The author believes that both Mao and Zhou made the statements concerning the danger of nuclear war that Gromyko attributed to them, because both remarks were consistent with Mao's own philosophy and view on the issue.

“I believe that both Mao and Zhou had made these statements concerning the danger of a nuclear war since both remarks were consistent with Mao's own philosophy and view on this issue.”