The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Examination of the Credence Attributes of an Audit
Abstract
SYNOPSIS: An audit consists of two main components: (1) the assessment of risk, and (2) the planning and execution of audit procedures. Both activities require a great deal of professional judgment. In this sense, the auditor is an expert who is best positioned to assess the risk and to conduct the audit in accordance with professional auditing standards. We use a simple decision-making framework to illustrate an auditor's possible strategies when an auditee cannot directly determine the effort level required to conduct an audit appropriately. We discuss and compare three economic perspectives for the audit: search goods, experience goods, and credence goods. Based on the economic theory of credence goods, we predict that a seller has incentives to act strategically when buyers are faced with considerable uncertainties relating to a service they purchase. Specifically, we argue that an auditor might have incentives to (1) under-audit, (2) over-audit, or (3) overcharge. These strategic actions have important implications for audit quality, efficiency, and regulation. We also discuss the professional and institutional arrangements that serve to limit the strategic behavior of auditors. Finally, we discuss previous empirical and behavioral audit evidence in the context of the credence aspects of an audit.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947 · cited 1×
“30 For an overview, see DeZoort and Lord (1997) or Jenkins et al.”
BackgroundThe Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Doyle, J. T., Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2007) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2007.82.5.1141 · Cited by 1,366
Empirical Analysis of the Economic Demand for Auditing in the Initial Public Offerings Market
Willenborg, M. (1999) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491405 · Cited by 416
High-Quality Financial Advice Wanted!
Bluethgen, R., Meyer, S., & Hackethal, A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1102445 · Cited by 21
Cited by
Audit Quality: Insights from the Academic Literature
Knechel, W. R., Krishnan, G. V., Pevzner, M., Shefchik, L. B., & Velury, U. K. (2013) · AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-50350 · Cited by 776
Self-citationA Review of the Archival Literature on Audit Partners
Lennox, C. S., & Wu, X. (2018) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch-51942 · Cited by 378
Metadata
- Authors
- Causholli, M., & Knechel, W. R.
- Venue
- Accounting Horizons
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2012-08-01
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 631-656
- ISSN
- 0888-7993 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7975
- OpenAlex
- W2139448806
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 34.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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