The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Internal Control Disclosures, Monitoring, and the Cost of Debt
Abstract
We test the relationship between the change in a firm's cost of debt and the disclosure of a material weakness in an initial Section 404 report. We find that, on average, a firm's credit spread on its publicly traded debt marginally increases if it discloses a material weakness. We also examine the impact of monitoring by credit rating agencies and/or banks on this result and find that the result is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored. Additional analysis indicates that the effect of bank monitoring appears to be the primary driver of these monitoring results. This finding is consistent with the argument that banks are effective delegated monitors for the debt market. The results of this study suggest the need for future research, particularly to test the differential effects of monitoring on the cost of debt compared to the cost of equity.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
James, C. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90003-1 · Cited by 1,610
The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2005) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch.2005.19.3.137 · Cited by 715
Cited by
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
ESG practices and the cost of debt: Evidence from EU countries
Eliwa, Y., Aboud, A., & Saleh, A. (2021) · Critical Perspectives on Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2019.102097 · Cited by 907
Cheng, M., Dhaliwal, D., & Zhang, Y. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.03.001 · Cited by 660
Self-citationInternal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures
Kim, J.-B., Song, B. Y., & Zhang, L. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-10036 · Cited by 432
Skaife, H. A., Veenman, D., & Wangerin, D. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.07.005 · Cited by 366
Metadata
- Authors
- Dhaliwal, D., Hogan, C., Trezevant, R., & Wilkins, M.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2011-04-01
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1131-1156
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2117017823
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 59.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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