The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision
Open accessAbstract
Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less) precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less pronounced when institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is more pronounced when investors have difficulty in assessing the precision of managers' information. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
Internal control and management guidance
Feng, M., Li, C., & McVay, S. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.004 · Cited by 678 · cited 1×
“In the first stage, we follow Lennox and Park (2006) and Feng et al. (2009) in modeling the likelihood of management forecasts.”
Method
Cited by
LI, Y., & ZHANG, L. (2015) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12068 · Cited by 258
Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts
Ittner, C. D., & Michels, J. (2017) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9396-0 · Cited by 111
Beyond earnings quality: evaluating the quality of corporate disclosure practices
Dechow, P. M., Ge, W., Loh, W. T., & McVay, S. (2026) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-026-09971-2 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Cheng, Q., Luo, T., & Yue, H.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2013-05-01
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1575-1602
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3121229698
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 29.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/accr-50506
- The paper
- Cheng, Q., Luo, T., & Yue, H. (2013). Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50506
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.