The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effects of Disseminating Relative Performance Feedback in Tournament and Individual Performance Compensation Plans
Open accessAbstract
ABSTRACT: This study investigates the effects of relative performance feedback and incentive compensation method on performance. We examine whether the presence and the content of relative performance feedback have different effects on performance when participants are compensated via a tournament or an individual incentive scheme. Our experimental results show a disordinal interaction between incentive scheme and feedback. Specifically, providing relative performance feedback improves the mean performance of participants compensated under an individual incentive scheme regardless of the precision or specific content of the feedback. In contrast, providing relative performance feedback deteriorates the mean performance of participants compensated under a tournament incentive scheme, but only if the feedback is sufficiently precise. Supplementary analysis suggests that this deterioration in performance is due to ineffective task strategies rather than reduced effort. We also find that in the absence of relative performance feedback, participants compensated under a tournament incentive scheme perform better, and their performance improves to a greater extent over time, compared to participants compensated under an individual incentive scheme. These results have implications for the design of accounting, control, and reporting systems in firms.
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Cites
A theory of social comparison processes
Festinger, L. (1954) · Human Relations · doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 · Cited by 20,926
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Social cognitive theory of self-regulation
Bandura, A. (1991) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90022-l · Cited by 6,875
Kluger, A. N., & DeNisi, A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.254 · Cited by 5,882
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance
Tosi, H. L., Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1991) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258875 · Cited by 4,839
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261010 · Cited by 4,560
Tosi, H. L. (1991) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1991.4278976 · Cited by 4,145
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Cited by
The Dark Side of Competition for Status
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747 · Cited by 510
Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records
Blanes i Vidal, J., & Nossol, M. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1383 · Cited by 310
Metadata
- Authors
- Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Newman, A. H.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2008-07-01
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 893-913
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2083440441
- Cited by
- 295
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 17.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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