Religiosity and Tax Avoidance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper, we examine religiosity as one determinant of tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers. Prior research suggests a relation between religiosity and risk aversion. Because aggressive tax avoidance strategies involve significant uncertainty and possible penalties and damage to reputation, we predict that higher levels of religiosity are associated with less aggressive (i.e., less risky) tax positions. Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms headquartered in more religious U.S. counties are less likely to avoid taxes. We also find that religiosity is consistently associated with lower tax avoidance by individual taxpayers, as measured by underreported income. These results hold after controlling for several firm-level, as well as county-level, demographic characteristics identified in prior research as affecting tax avoidance by corporate and/or individual taxpayers. We conclude that religiosity is a significant determinant of tax avoidance by corporate and individual taxpayers.
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Citations
Cites
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“More recently, Dyreng et al. (2010) find that individual executives have an incremental effect on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Their argument is that individual top executives are partially responsible for the variation in tax avoidance across firms, not necessarily thro…”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialAre family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?
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“…and Catholic (CATHOLIC) adherents which are linearly interpolated to obtain values in missing years.11 3.1.3 Company-level Control Variables As noted in the previous section, we control for a set of variables that Chen et al. (2010) report as influencing a firm’s tax avoidance activities.”
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“21 percent), which is consistent with the distributional characteristics for cash ETRs reported in Dyreng et al. (2008). The mean (median) propensity to engage in tax sheltering (SHELTER) is 0.”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Cited by
Hasan, I., Hoi, C. K. (., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.004 · Cited by 653
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The impact of corporate governance on corporate tax avoidance—A literature review
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Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues
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Perspectives on Corporate Tax Planning: Observations from the Past Decade
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Military experience and corporate tax avoidance
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Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Boone, J. P., Khurana, I. K., & Raman, K. K.
- Venue
- The Journal of the American Taxation Association
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2012-10-01
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-84
- ISSN
- 0198-9073 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-8017
- OpenAlex
- W2166740002
- Cited by
- 248
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 22.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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