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The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance
Open accessAbstract
ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether individual top executives have incremental effects on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms’ effective tax rates, we construct a data set that tracks the movement of 908 executives across firms over time. Results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake. The economic magnitude of the executive effects on tax avoidance is large. Moving between the top and bottom quartiles of executives results in approximately an 11 percent swing in GAAP effective tax rates; thus, executive effects appear to be an important determinant in firms’ tax avoidance.
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Cites
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.52.3.351 · Cited by 2,074
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The importance of the internal information environment for tax avoidance
Gallemore, J., & Labro, E. (2015) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.005 · Cited by 575
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Commitment to social good and insider trading
Gao, F., Lisic, L. L., & Zhang, I. X. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.03.001 · Cited by 375
Predicting tax avoidance by means of social network analytics
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2010-07-01
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1163-1189
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3124595561
- Cited by
- 1,588
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 140.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Dyreng, S. D., Hanlon, M., & Maydew, E. L. (2010). The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1163
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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