The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economic Incentives for Voluntary Reporting on Internal Risk Management and Control Systems
Abstract
This paper investigates managers' economic incentives for voluntary reporting on risk management and internal control using a sample of publicly traded firms in The Netherlands in the late 1990s. In this particular setting, internal control reporting was voluntary and covered a wide business-based approach as defined in key internal control frameworks. We create an index to measure the extent of disclosure by identifying six reportable items related to internal control. Regarding managers' incentives to report, we hypothesize that voluntary disclosure increases with the extent of information and agency problems, as proxied by management and block holder ownership and financial leverage. Supporting our hypotheses, we find a negative relationship between the extent of internal control disclosure and management and block holder ownership, and positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and financial leverage. We interpret these findings as evidence for a conscious trade-off by managers, which is linked to the costs and benefits of making internal control disclosures. Additionally, we find some evidence that the extent of disclosure varies with firms' inherent risk exposure, as proxied by a number of firm operating characteristics. One implication of our findings is that regulators may wish to allow firms flexibility in their internal control reporting choice, as firms take a broad approach to internal control that goes beyond SOX-based regulations, and tailor their internal control reports to suit their specific environments.
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Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00018-0 · Cited by 8,097
Reliability of Nominal Data Based on Qualitative Judgments
Perreault, W. D., & Leigh, L. E. (1989) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.2307/3172601 · Cited by 1,575
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Doyle, J. T., Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2007) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2007.82.5.1141 · Cited by 1,366
The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2005) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch.2005.19.3.137 · Cited by 715
Cited by
Determinants of narrative risk disclosures in UK interim reports
Elzahar, H., & Hussainey, K. (2012) · The Journal of Risk Finance · doi:10.1108/15265941211203189 · Cited by 404
Elshandidy, T., Fraser, I., & Hussainey, K. (2013) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.010 · Cited by 276
Financial distress, internal control, and earnings management: Evidence from China
Li, Y., Li, X., Xiang, E., & Geri Djajadikerta, H. (2020) · Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2020.100210 · Cited by 270
Elshandidy, T., & Neri, L. (2015) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12095 · Cited by 262
Risk reporting: A review of the literature and implications for future research✩
Elshandidy, T., Shrives, P. J., Bamber, M., & Abraham, S. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Literature · doi:10.1016/j.acclit.2017.12.001 · Cited by 166
Metadata
- Authors
- Deumes, R., & Knechel, W. R.
- Venue
- AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2008-05-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-66
- ISSN
- 0278-0380 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7991
- OpenAlex
- W2171582467
- Cited by
- 242
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 15.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Deumes, R., & Knechel, W. R. (2008). Economic Incentives for Voluntary Reporting on Internal Risk Management and Control Systems. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory. https://doi.org/10.2308/aud.2008.27.1.35
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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