The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance
Abstract
SUMMARY: The objective of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive view of corporate governance than that considered by the traditional agency literature predominately employed in auditing and accounting studies of governance. Specifically, we discuss three widely recognized additional theoretical perspectives: resource dependence, managerial hegemony, and institutional theory. Resource dependence is developed in the strategic management literature and focuses on the contribution of governance mechanisms as a vehicle to help a firm achieve or further its strategic objectives. In contrast with the agency and resource dependence perspectives which offer a functional view of governance, the managerial hegemony perspective views the board and its attendant committees as being under the control of management and hence could be potentially viewed as dysfunctional from a stakeholder viewpoint. Finally, institutional theory, developed in the sociology of organizations and organizational behavior literatures, suggests that it is necessary to understand the substance of the interactions between different governance parties and how these parties use at times symbolic gestures and activities to maintain their form to all relevant parties. Although the value of using multiple theoretical perspectives with respect to governance has been well recognized in the economics and behavioral literatures, this is the first paper that we are aware of that examines the effect of using alternative theories of governance on auditing issues that are influenced by the governance structure of a firm. In addition, we examine how these theories provide a useful basis for reconciling conflicting findings in the existing agency-based audit-related governance literature. Finally, we provide examples of how these alternative theories provide important new insights to issues in auditing research and practice.
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Self-citationCorporate Governance in the Post‐Sarbanes‐Oxley Era: Auditors’ Experiences*
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Self-citationPeters, G. F., & Romi, A. M. (2015) · AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-50849 · Cited by 461
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Self-citationFemale Board Presence and the Likelihood of Financial Restatement
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CEO-director ties and labor investment efficiency
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Cohen, J. R., Krishnamoorthy, G., & Wright, A. M.
- Venue
- AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2008-11-01
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-198
- ISSN
- 0278-0380 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7991
- OpenAlex
- W3121770758
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 32.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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