The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Analyzing the Security of Bluetooth Low Energy
Abstract
Internet of Things devices have spread to near ubiquity this decade. All around us now lies an invisible mesh of communication from devices embedded in seemingly everything. Inevitably some of that communication flying around our heads will contain data that must be protected or otherwise shielded from tampering. The responsibility to protect this sensitive information from malicious actors as it travels through the air then falls upon the standards used to communicate this data. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is one of these standards, the aim of this paper is to put its security standards to test. By attempting to exploit its vulnerabilities we can see how secure this standard really is. In this paper, we present steps for analyzing the security of BLE devices using open-source hardware and software.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“After eavesdropping on the network key, the attacker can decrypt data packets [66].”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [66]
In the citing paper
“Chatzoglou et al. [66] proposed that when an attacker can access a device at the physical level, since the LoRa terminal device contains a radio module and a host microcontroller unit, the radio communicates with the host microcontroller through the UART or SPI interface. For example, if both devices use the UART interface, the interface can be used to eavesdrop on all key exchanges, and the AttaC”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [66]
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Research works printed but not linked: 12
- 10.1109/GLOCOM.2015.7417504 · DOI
- 0, Indoor Location with Bluetooth and Mesh
- 0, Bluefruit LE Sniffer - Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE 4 0)
- 10.18178/lnit.3.1.31-34 · DOI
- dicola, 0, Reverse Engineering a Bluetooth Low Energy Light Bulb
- 10.1109/SOCA.2014.20 · DOI
- grassi, 0, How to Capture Bluetooth Packets on Android 4 4
- sharma, 2008, Bluetooth Security Issues, Threats and Consequences, Proceedings of 2nd National Conference on Challenges & Opportunities in Information Technology (COIT-2008), 78
- 10.1109/HONET.2008.4810232 · DOI
- mendez, 2017, Internet of Things Security and Privacy, abs 1707 1879
- ossmann, 0, Project Ubertooth
- townsend, 2014, Getting Started with Bluetooth Low Energy
Cited by
Sorted by citations
A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends
Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z. (2024) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518 · Cited by 172
Metadata
- Authors
- Sevier, S., & Tekeoglu, A.
- Affiliations
- SUNY Polytechnic Institute (US)
- ORCID
- Tekeoglu, Ali
- Venue
- 2019 International Conference on Electronics, Information, and Communication (ICEIC)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-01
- Pages
- 1-5
- OpenAlex
- W2944597984
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 2.38
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Electronics, Information, and Communication (ICEIC) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Bluetooth and Wireless Communication Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Keywords
- Bluetooth Low Energy, Internet of Things security, security analysis, open-source hardware, open source software
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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