Cited by 12Indigenous Peoples' Rights and LawAmerican Constitutional Law and PoliticsIndigenous Cultures and History

The DOI matches its Crossref record; none of the 88 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Domesticating Federal Indian Law

Open access
Frickey, Philip P.·1996·Minnesota Law Review

Abstract

As every schoolchild learns," the Supreme Court has said, "our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government."'What schoolchildren-and almost all law students-do not learn is that this story of sovereignty is radically incomplete."Our Federalism" 2 came about through our colonialism.Accordingly, although sovereignty created by the United States Constitution is indeed dual, sovereignty within the United States is triadic: American Indian tribes have sovereignty as well.Precisely a century ago, the Supreme Court itself squarely recognized that tribal sovereignty is not "created by and springing from the Constitution," 3 but rather is an inherent sovereignty that "existed prior to the Constitution" 4 and is, therefore, not subject to it.5 Tribes today continue to exercise sovereignty in a

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This Article argues that congressional plenary power in federal Indian law, like plenary power in immigration law, arose from international-law notions of inherent sovereignty tied to colonization, and that it should be “domesticated” by subjecting it to domestic constitutional and interpretive limits. It proposes internationalizing the field—using emerging international indigenous-rights norms as a backdrop for constitutional and quasi-constitutional interpretation—while preserving tribal collectivity and sovereignty rather than mainstreaming Indians as individuals.

Key findings

  • Plenary power in federal Indian law and immigration law developed from inherent sovereignty under international law: *Kagama*, the *Chinese Exclusion Case*, *Lone Wolf*, and *Sandoval* treated control over Indians and foreigners as a centralized national power, not one strictly enumerated in the Constitution.
  • Reform cannot follow the same path in both fields: immigration law can be reformed individualistically and integrationist, but federal Indian law must retain collectivist, separatist, and unique legal elements because “uncoupling the tribal member from the sovereignty of her tribe would destroy most of what is unique and worth preserving in federal Indian law.”
  • The Article proposes that international law both justifies a limited federal power over Indian affairs and supplies limits on it; it illustrates this through Takings and Free Exercise, arguing that Indian land is not fungible and that *Lyng* defined religious burden too narrowly.
  • It reports that allotment deprived Indians of more than two-thirds of their land base between 1887 and 1934; that by 1992 the Black Hills judgment fund exceeded $315 million while the Sioux refused money; and that mid-twentieth-century Missouri River projects took over 550 square miles of Indian land and displaced over 900 Indian families.

Methods

  • Doctrinal and historical legal analysis of Supreme Court decisions, including the Marshall trilogy, *Kagama*, *Lone Wolf*, *Sandoval*, the *Chinese Exclusion Case*, *Seminole Tribe*, and *Lyng*, along with treaties, statutes, and scholarly commentary.
  • Normative reconstruction comparing federal Indian law and immigration law, then applying international-law and international human-rights norms to constitutional interpretation and canons of construction.
  • No empirical data collection or statistical analysis; the argument is interpretive and prescriptive.

Limitations

  • The paper states that its normative and empirical judgments are “subject to debate” and that it is not the place for a “full-blown defense” of its working assumptions.
  • It acknowledges tension between express-powers and inherent-power models of congressional authority and says the conflict may not be definitively resolvable today.
  • Evident from the text: the argument is doctrinal and normative rather than empirical, and it relies on contested claims about the domestic relevance of international law and the normative attractiveness of tribal sovereignty.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.24926/265535.2992

Cites

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

120 Own interpretation · 79 Sources not found · 15 No basis given · 5 Not checked yet

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 91
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 52
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
122 of 122
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    All nations have inherent authority to control the influx of foreigners.

    “All nations have inherent authority to control the influx of foreigners.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Under the policy of allotment, Congress deprived Indians of more than two-thirds of their land base between 1887 and 1934.

    “Under the policy of allotment, Congress deprived Indians of more than two-thirds of their land base between 1887 and 1934.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    International law sanctioned colonization.

    “Because international law sanctioned colonization”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The most normatively attractive aspects of federal Indian law are those that respect tribal independence and federal supremacy over state governments in Indian affairs.

    “The most normatively attractive aspects of federal Indian law have respected tribal independence and federal supremacy over state governments in Indian affairs.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Tribal sovereignty and separation are worth preserving in federal Indian law.

    “Uncoupling the tribal member from the sovereignty of her tribe would destroy most of what is unique and worth preserving in federal Indian law.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The constitutional void in federal Indian law is harsh, anomalous, and merits reconsideration.

    “That the constitutional void in federal Indian law is harsh, anomalous, and merits reconsideration seems beyond question.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The colonial process would remain ongoing for the foreseeable future, if not forever.

    “because the sovereign nation that the constitutional framers set out to establish resulted from a colonial process that would remain ongoing for the foreseeable future, if not forever”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Congress has some inherent power to deal with the issues in Indian affairs that may extend beyond the precise text of the Constitution.

    “If we assume that Congress has some inherent power to deal with the issues in Indian affairs that may extend beyond the precise text of the Constitution, there remains an obvious constitutional theory for ameliorating abuses of that power: the application of the Bill of Rights.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The only legitimate constitutional justification for an expansive federal power over Indian affairs lies in interpreting the Constitution against the backdrop of international law.

    “If the only legitimate constitutional justification for an expansive federal power over Indian affairs lies in interpreting the Constitution against the backdrop of international law, then international law is an important framework for constitutional interpretation throughout the field of federal Indian law.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The federal government has the power of eminent domain to take privately held land and transfer title to the tribe in compensation for Indian land taken.

    “The government has that power”
10 of 10

Citations

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. In this respect, Lyng, in involving religious sites, is distinguishable from Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which the claim was that the federal assignment and internal governmental use of a social security number in- vaded Native American religious freedom. In addition, in this context Native Americans could also contend that their right to free exercise of religion is informed by Article 18 of the Interna- tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Unlike ILO Convention 169, supra note 190, the International Covenant has been ratified by the United States. See supra text accompanying note 213 (noting that the United States has not ratified the Convention). The support of the International Covenant [Vol. 81:31

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Metadata

Authors
Frickey, P. P.
Corresponding author
Frickey, Philip P.
Venue
Minnesota Law Review
Published
1996
Volume
81
Issue
1
Pages
31
ISSN
0026-5535 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W24553936
Cited by
12
References
0
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 6 · 2016: 1 · 2013: 1
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • Minnesota law review (publishedVersion)
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
  • Minnesota law review
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Law
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Anthropology › Indigenous Cultures and History
Keywords
federal Indian law, tribal sovereignty, dual sovereignty, colonialism, United States Constitution, Supreme Court

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