Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In polymatrix coordination games, each player x is a node of a graph and must select an action in her strategy set.Nodes are playing separate bimatrix games with their neighbors in the graph.Namely, the utility of x is given by the preference she has for her action plus, for each neighbor y, a payoff which strictly depends on the mutual actions played by x and y.We propose the new class of distance polymatrix coordination games, properly generalizing polymatrix coordination games, in which the overall utility of player x further depends on the payoffs arising from mutual actions of players v, z that are the endpoints of edges at any distance h < d from x, for a fixed threshold value d ≤ n.In particular, the overall utility of player x is the sum of all the above payoffs, where each payoff is proportionally discounted by a factor depending on the distance h of the corresponding edge.Under the above framework, which is a natural generalization that is well-suited for capturing positive community interactions, we study the social inefficiency of equilibria resorting to standard measures of Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.Namely, we provide suitable upper and lower bounds for the aforementioned quantities, both for boundeddegree and general graphs.
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Cites
Aziz, H., Brandl, F., Brandt, F., Harrenstein, P., OLSEN, M. E., & Peters, D. (2014) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.65109/nkht8291 · Cited by 118
Nash Stable Outcomes in Fractional Hedonic Games: Existence, Efficiency and Computation
Bilò, V., Fanelli, A., Flammini, M., Monaco, G., & Moscardelli, L. (2018) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1.11211 · Cited by 62
Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax
Cai, Y., Candogan, O., Daskalakis, C., & Papadimitriou, C. H. (2016) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2015.0745 · Cited by 60
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
Aziz, H., Brandt, F., & Seedig, H. G. (n.d.) · Cited by 18
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Unleashing the potential of prompt engineering for large language models
Chen, B., Zhang, Z., Langrené, N., & Zhu, S. (2025) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2025.101260 · Cited by 490
A Comprehensive Survey on Deep Graph Representation Learning
Ju, W., Fang, Z., Gu, Y., Liu, Z., Long, Q., Qiao, Z., Qin, Y., Shen, J., Sun, F., Xiao, Z., et al. (2024) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106207 · Cited by 341
Hybrid deep learning model using SPCAGAN augmentation for insider threat analysis
R.G., G., Sajjanhar, A., & Xiang, Y. (2024) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2024.123533 · Cited by 28
Kraft, A., & Soulier, E. (2024) · The 2024 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3630106.3658981 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Published
- 2021-08
- OpenAlex
- W4213052788
- Cited by
- 368
- References
- 4
- Type
- paratext
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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