Cited by 173Knowledge Management and SharingExpert finding and Q&A systemsDigital Platforms and Economics

Engaging Voluntary Contributions in Online Communities: A Hidden Markov Model1

Chen, Wei, Wei, Xiahua, Zhu, Kevin Xiaoguo·2018·MIS Quarterly

Abstract

User contribution is critical to online communities but also difficult to sustain given its public goods nature. This paper studies the design of IT artifacts to motivate voluntary contributions in online communities. We propose a dynamic approach, which allows the effect of motivating mechanisms to change across users over time. We characterize the dynamics of user contributions using a hidden Markov model (HMM) with latent motivation states under the public goods framework. We focus on three motivating mechanisms on transitioning users between the latent states: reciprocity, peer recognition, and self-image. Based on Bayesian estimation of the model with user-level panel data, we identify three motivation states (low, medium, and high), and show that the motivating mechanisms, implemented through various IT artifacts, could work differently across states. Specifically, reciprocity is only effective to transition users from low to medium motivation state, whereas peer recognition can boost all users to higher states. And self-image shows no effect when a user is already in high motivation state, although it helps users in low and medium states move to the high state. Design simulations on our structural model provide additional insights into the consequences of changing specific IT artifacts. These findings offer implications for platform designers on how to motivate user contributions and build sustainable online communities.

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Crossref · 10.25300/misq/2018/14196

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2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Positive market signals of worth are an incentive to commit in open source.

    “which research has shown is an incentive to commit (W Chen et al., 2018)”

    From The sustainability of open source commons (2023) · cites this paper as W Chen et al., 2018

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Authors
Chen, W., Wei, X., & Zhu, K. X.
Affiliations
  • University of Arizona (US)
  • University of Washington Bothell (US)
  • University of California San Diego (US)
Venue
MIS Quarterly
Publisher
MIS Quarterly
Published
2018-03-01
Volume
42
Issue
1
Pages
83-100
ISSN
  • 0276-7783 (ISSN-L)
  • 2162-9730
OpenAlex
W2783899661
Cited by
173
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 5 · 2016: 1
FWCI
27.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
MIS Quarterly (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Knowledge Management and Sharing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Expert finding and Q&A systems
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
Keywords
voluntary contributions, online communities, public goods, user motivation, reciprocity, peer recognition, self-image, hidden Markov models, platform design, sustainable communities

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