Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 20 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
When making decisions, we often must consider multiple alternative outcomes of events that will happen in the future, or events that have already happened but the outcome is unknown. How do children navigate uncertainty across different points in time? Here, we tested several developmental hypotheses for children’s ability to reason about possibilities in the present and in the future. In two experiments (n = 192, US 3- and 4-year-olds), children were asked to prepare for two mutually exclusive possible outcomes of an event that either will occur in the future (Future condition) or that had already occurred but the outcome was currently unknown (Present condition). In Experiment 1 (n = 96), children were asked to reason about the possible location of an object in an event. In Experiment 2 (n = 96), children were asked to reason about the possible identity of an object in an event. In both experiments, we replicated previous patterns of success with future possibility reasoning, and found no differences in children’s ability to reason about possible outcomes in the present versus the future. Our results suggest that the ability to navigate uncertainty across different timepoints may emerge together in early development.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
In two experiments with 192 U.S. 3- and 4-year-olds, children reasoned about mutually exclusive possible outcomes of events in the future versus events that had already occurred but whose outcomes were unknown. Children performed similarly across Future and Present conditions, suggesting that reasoning about possibility in the present and future may emerge together in early development.
Key findings
- Across both experiments, there was no main effect of condition: Experiment 1 possible-locations GLMM found no Future vs. Present difference (B = -0.8747, p = .728; BF01 = 6.38), and Experiment 2 possible-identities GLMM also found no condition effect (B = -1.2926, p = .6031; BF01 = 6.32).
- Experiment 1 (n = 96) replicated the age pattern for possible locations: 4-year-olds outperformed 3-year-olds (p < .001), while Present-condition performance was similar to Future-condition performance. In the Future condition, 58% of 4-year-olds and 37.5% of 3-year-olds placed hands under both exits in Trial 1; in the Present condition, 62.5% of 4-year-olds and 25% of 3-year-olds did so.
- Experiment 2 (n = 96) replicated prior possible-identity success: in the Future condition, 79% of children in both age groups selected both snacks in each test trial. Present-condition responses were similar, with 70% of 3-year-olds and 75% of 4-year-olds selecting both snacks in Trial 1, and 79% of 3-year-olds and 87.5% of 4-year-olds doing so in Trial 2.
- The authors conclude the results provide some support for the hypothesis that reasoning about possibility across different time points may be supported by the same cognitive architecture, and that present possibility reasoning may emerge earlier than previously thought.
Methods
- Two between-participants experiments tested 3- and 4-year-olds at the Museum of Science, Boston: Experiment 1 (n = 96) used a modified inverted Y-shaped tube task to assess possible locations; Experiment 2 (n = 96) used a modified playground slide task to assess possible identities. Each experiment contrasted a Future condition with a Present condition.
- In Experiment 1, children prepared to catch a ball that could emerge from one of two exits; in the Present condition, the ball had already fallen into an opaque box and its location was unknown. In Experiment 2, children prepared snacks for one of two animals; in the Present condition, the animal had already slid into an opaque box and its identity was unknown.
- Main analyses were Generalized Linear Mixed Models with age group, condition, and trial as fixed effects and participant ID as a random effect, plus Bayes factor analyses on summed responses across trials. The experiments were not preregistered.
Limitations
- The authors state that a null result is not definite evidence that similar cognitive processes support present and future reasoning; the tasks were simplified, always involved only two possibilities, and had a known possibility space, so asymmetries might appear in more complex or uncertain scenarios or later in development.
- The authors note that their design cannot distinguish among possible mechanisms, and that both future-oriented thinking and metacognitive monitoring could have been limiting factors that the conditions isolated. They also consider and argue against the possibility that children failed to understand the Present condition as different from the Future condition, while acknowledging they cannot definitively rule this out.
- Evident from the text: the samples were recruited at a museum, were not preregistered, and included predominantly White children and many caregivers with a college degree or higher, which may limit generalizability.
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Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
6 Valid · 3 Not valid · 8 Not checked · 36 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The results of Experiment 1 contrast with the results obtained by Robinson et al. (2006).”
§ Children's reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future > Discussion
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Robinson et al. (2006) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and Discussion for Robinson et al.'s Experiment 1 (page unavailable) report better performance on unknowable than unknown trials. That establishes Robinson et al.'s results, but their paper cannot establish whether the citing document's Experiment 1 contrasts with them; that comparison is not verifiable from this source alone. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“These results suggest that reasoning about possibility in the future may emerge earlier than reasoning about possibility in the present.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Robinson et al. (2006) source
Experiment 2 (page unavailable) contrasts an event that had already happened with one yet to happen. The Results and Discussion (page unavailable) report that even 4- to 5-year-olds covered both possibilities for an undetermined outcome, whereas 5- to 6-year-olds often failed when the outcome was already fixed but unknown. This supports the citing sentence’s tentative developmental inference. (LLM, conf=0.88)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The demands of representing the unknown (but knowable) identity of an object without the benefit of perceptual markers of the space of possibilities may have resulted in the difference in performance observed in Robinson et al.'s (2006) study.”
§ Children's reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future > Discussion
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Robinson et al. (2006) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and Discussion report poorer performance when an object's location was already determined but unknown to the child, and the Final Discussion attributes this pattern to the demands of representing one's own ignorance. The paper does not attribute the difference to a lack of perceptual markers; it describes children using physical markers to indicate possible outcomes. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“In subsequent experiments, children only began performing well at presentpossibility reasoning around age 7 years.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Robinson et al. (2006) source
In Experiment 3’s Result and Discussion (page unavailable), 67% of 7- to 8-year-olds passed the reality-unknown action task, compared with 30% of 5- to 6-year-olds. The paper reports that the older children performed significantly better, while noting that their performance was not at ceiling. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Robinson et al. (2006) found that children were more successful on trials that required reasoning about a future possible identity of an object compared to trials that required reasoning about the present possible identity of an object.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Robinson et al. (2006) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results and Discussion report better performance when an event was yet to happen than when it had already happened but was unknown to the child (70% versus 40% in Experiment 2). But the same section describes the future task as involving a baby pet of unknown identity and the present task as involving a pet of unknown location; it does not compare future and present possible identities of an object. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
29 more claims · 2 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 53 claims and to verify the 6 references still open.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 11
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
- It may state two separate claims as one. 9
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Smith, J. M., Mohamadpour, H., Engelmann, J. M., Davis, H. E., Krieger, J., Sørensen, B. G., Koster, J., Heysieattalab, S., & Amir, D. (2025) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/desc.70078 · Cited by 1
Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the futurePreprint
Küçük, E. N., & Kibbe, M. M. (2025) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/vudfm_v2
Self-citationImagine All the Possibilities: Toddlers Adapt to Alternative FuturesPreprint
Altunay, H. M., Ziemann, L., Swaboda, N., & Ruggeri, A. (2025) · OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/bawmk_v1
Metadata
- Authors
- Küçük, E. N., & Kibbe, M. M.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Publisher
- Center for Open Science
- Published
- 2025-01-18
- OpenAlex
- W4406566580
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Language Development and Disorders
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Cognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skills
- Keywords
- uncertainty, children's reasoning, future events, time perception, object location, object identity, early development, preschool children, decision-making
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