Cited by 80Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentLanguage Development and DisordersPsychological and Educational Research Studies

Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Epistemic and Physical Uncertainty

Robinson, Elizabeth J, Rowley, Martin G, Beck, Sarah R, Carroll, Dan J, Apperly, Ian A·2006·Child Development

Abstract

Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and “curse of knowledge.”

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x

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  • The demands of representing the unknown identity of an object without perceptual markers may have resulted in the difference in performance observed in Robinson et al.'s (2006) study.

    “The demands of representing the unknown (but knowable) identity of an object without the benefit of perceptual markers of the space of possibilities may have resulted in the difference in performance observed in Robinson et al.'s (2006) study.”

    From Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future (2025) · cites this paper as Robinson et al. (2006)

    The Results and Discussion report poorer performance when an object's location was already determined but unknown to the child, and the Final Discussion attributes this pattern to the demands of representing one's own ignorance. The paper does not attribute the difference to a lack of perceptual markers; it describes children using physical markers to indicate possible outcomes. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Robinson et al. (2006) found that children were more successful on trials requiring reasoning about a future possible identity of an object compared to trials requiring reasoning about the present possible identity of an object.

    “Robinson et al. (2006) found that children were more successful on trials that required reasoning about a future possible identity of an object compared to trials that required reasoning about the present possible identity of an object.”

    From Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future (2025) · cites this paper as Robinson et al. (2006)

    The Results and Discussion report better performance when an event was yet to happen than when it had already happened but was unknown to the child (70% versus 40% in Experiment 2). But the same section describes the future task as involving a baby pet of unknown identity and the present task as involving a pet of unknown location; it does not compare future and present possible identities of an object. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The results of Experiment 1 contrast with the results obtained by Robinson et al. (2006).

    “The results of Experiment 1 contrast with the results obtained by Robinson et al. (2006).”

    From Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future (2025) · cites this paper as Robinson et al. (2006)

    The Results and Discussion for Robinson et al.'s Experiment 1 (page unavailable) report better performance on unknowable than unknown trials. That establishes Robinson et al.'s results, but their paper cannot establish whether the citing document's Experiment 1 contrasts with them; that comparison is not verifiable from this source alone. (LLM, conf=0.76)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Reasoning about possibility in the future may emerge earlier than reasoning about possibility in the present.

    “These results suggest that reasoning about possibility in the future may emerge earlier than reasoning about possibility in the present.”

    From Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future (2025) · cites this paper as Robinson et al. (2006)

  • In subsequent experiments, children only began performing well at present possibility reasoning around age 7 years.

    “In subsequent experiments, children only began performing well at presentpossibility reasoning around age 7 years.”

    From Children’s reasoning about possible outcomes of events in the present and the future (2025) · cites this paper as Robinson et al. (2006)

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. Asher, S.R. & Wigfield, A. (1981). Training referential communication skills. In W.P.Dickson, (Ed) Children's oral communication skills. New York: Academic Press. (pp105-126).
  2. Baldwin, D., & Moses, L (1994). Early understanding of referential intent and attentional focus: Evidence from language and emotion. In C. Lewis & P. Mitchell (Eds.) Children's early understanding of mind. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (pp133-156).
  3. Beal, C. R. (1988). Children's knowledge about representations of intended meaning. In J.W. Astington, P.L. Harris & D.R. Olson (Eds.) Developing theories of mind . Cambridge: Cambridge University press. (pp 315-325).
  4. Beck, S. R. & Robinson, E. J. (2001). Children's ability to make tentative interpretations of ambiguous messages. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 79, 95-114.
  5. Braine, M. D. S., & Rumain, B. (1983). Logical Reasoning. In J. H. Flavell & E. M. Markman (Eds.), Cognitive Development (4 th ed., Vol. III, pp. 266-340). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
  6. Chandler, M., Hallet, D., & Sokol, B. W. (2002). Competing claims about competing knowledge claims. In B. Hofer & P. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal Epistemology Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
  7. Fox, C.R. & Tversky, A. (1995). Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 , 585-603.
  8. Heath, C. & Tversky, A. (1991). Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4 , 5-28.
  9. Kuhn, D (2000). Theory of mind, metacognition and reasoning: A lifespan perspective. In P. Mitchell and K. Riggs (Eds.) Children's reasoning and the mind. Hove, UK: Psychology Press (pp301-326).
  10. Mitchell, P (1996). Acquiring a conception of mind: A review of psychological research and theory . Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
  11. O'Neill, D.K. & Topolovec, J.C. (2001) Two-year-old children's sensitivity to the referential inefficiency of their own pointing gestures. Journal of Child Language, 28 , 1-28.
  12. Piéraut-Le Bonniec, G. (1980). The development of modal reasoning: Genesis of necessity and possibility notions. New York: Academic Press.
  13. Robinson, E.J., Goelman, H. and Olson, D. (1983). Children's understanding of the relation between expressions (what was said) and intentions (what was meant ). British Journal of Developmental Psychology , 1, 75- 86.
  14. Robinson, E. J. & Whittaker, S. J. (1987). Children's conceptions of relations between messages, meanings and reality. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 81-90.
  15. Rothbart, M. & Snyder M. (1970). Confidence in the prediction and postdiction of an uncertain outcome. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 2, 38-43.
  16. Whitehurst, G.J. & Sonneschein, S (1981). The development of informative messages in referential communication: Knowing when versus knowing how. In W.P.Dickson, (Ed) Children's oral communication skills. New York: Academic Press. (pp127-142.)

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Authors
Robinson, E. J., Rowley, M. G., Beck, S. R., Carroll, D. J., & Apperly, I. A.
Affiliations
  • University of Warwick (GB)
  • Keele University (GB)
  • University of Birmingham (GB)
Corresponding author
Robinson, Elizabeth J
Venue
Child Development
Published
2006-11-01
Volume
77
Issue
6
Pages
1642-1655
ISSN
  • 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8624
OpenAlex
W2032946923
Cited by
80
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
FWCI
2.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Child Development (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) (submittedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Language Development and Disorders
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Psychological and Educational Research Studies
Keywords
epistemic uncertainty, physical uncertainty, theory of mind, curse of knowledge, hidden object task, cognitive development
MeSH terms
Attitude, Child, Child, Preschool, Cognition, Female, Humans, Male, Psychological Theory, Knowledge

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