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Cited by 246

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Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon

Open access
Meltzer, Martin I., Damon, Inger, LeDuc, James W., Millar, J. Donald·2001·Emerging Infectious Diseases

Abstract

We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to <0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by > or = 33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

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Metadata

Authors
Meltzer, M. I., Damon, I., LeDuc, J. W., & Millar, J. D.
Venue
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Published
2001-12
Volume
7
Issue
6
Pages
959-969
ISSN
  • 1080-6040 (ISSN-L)
  • 1080-6059
OpenAlex
W2116002746
Cited by
246
References
0
FWCI
9.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3201/eid0706.010607
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Meltzer, M. I., Damon, I., LeDuc, J. W., & Millar, J. D. (2001). Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist Weapon. Emerging Infectious Diseases. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid0706.010607

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.