The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols
Open accessAbstract
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique for the verification of secrecy. The protocol is represented in an extension of the pi calculus with fairly arbitrary cryptographic primitives. This protocol representation includes the specification of the correspondence to be verified, but no other annotation. This representation is then translated into an abstract representation by Horn clauses, which is used to prove the desired correspondence. Our technique has been proved correct and implemented. We have tested it on various protocols from the literature. The experimental results show that these protocols can be verified by our technique in less than 1 s.
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Cites
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
Bellare, M., & Rogaway, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48329-2_21 · Cited by 1,752
Cited by
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Blanchet, B. (2016) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000004 · Cited by 321
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Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchet, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Computer Security
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-07-02
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 363-434
- ISSN
- 0926-227X (ISSN-L)
- 1875-8924
- OpenAlex
- W2161706819
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 26.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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