The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif
Open accessAbstract
ProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives, defined by rewrite rules or by equations. It can prove various security properties: secrecy, authentication, and process equivalences, for an unbounded message space and an unbounded number of sessions. It takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a dialect of the applied pi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol description into Horn clauses and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses. This survey presents an overview of the research on ProVerif.
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Cites
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Cited by
SoK: Computer-Aided Cryptography
Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Bhargavan, K., Blanchet, B., Cremers, C., Liao, K., & Parno, B. (2021) · 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40001.2021.00008 · Cited by 143
Self-citationTowards formal verification of IoT protocols: A Review
Hofer-Schmitz, K., & Stojanović, B. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2020.107233 · Cited by 104
An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols
Jacomme, C., & Kremer, S. (2021) · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/3440712 · Cited by 51
Formal verification of the W3C web authentication protocol
Guirat, I. B., & Halpin, H. (2018) · Proceedings of the 5th Annual Symposium and Bootcamp on Hot Topics in the Science of Security · doi:10.1145/3190619.3190640 · Cited by 16
Decentralized Self-Verifiable Cryptographic Image Provenance in Social Internet of Things
Akram, J., Akram, A., & Anaissi, A. (2026) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi18080402
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchet, B.
- Venue
- Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 1-135
- ISSN
- 2474-1558 (ISSN-L)
- 2474-1566
- OpenAlex
- W2544274814
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 19.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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