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Cited by 180Coastal and Marine ManagementMarine and fisheries researchSustainable Development and Environmental Management

Beyond the tragedy of the Commons

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Basurto, Xavier, Ostrom, Elinor·2009·ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
DOI 10.3280/efe2009-001004
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Abstract

- To move beyond Hardin's tragedy of the commons, it is fundamental to avoid falling into either of two analytical and policy traps: deriving and recommending "panaceas" or asserting "my case is unique". We can move beyond both traps by self-consciously building diagnostic theory to help unpack and understand the complex interrelationship between social and biophysical factors at different levels of analysis. We need to look for commonalities and differences across studies. This understanding will be augmented if the rich detail produced from case studies is used together with theory to find patterned structures among cases. In this paper, we briefly illustrate important steps of how we can go about diagnosing the emergence and sustainability of self-organization in the fishing context of the Gulf of California, Mexico. By doing so, we are able to move away from the universality proposed by Hardin and understand how two out of three fisheries were able to successfully self-organize, and why one of them continues to be robust over time. Keywords: sustainable development; renewable resources fisheries; renewable resources commons JEL classifications: QO1; Q20; D70 Parole chiave: sviluppo sostenibile; risorse rinnovabili; zone di pesca; proprietŕ comuni

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  • Vertical coordination may be necessary for political and legal legitimacy.

    “This suggests that vertical coordination may also be necessary for political and legal legitimacy (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009;Pahl-Wostl, Lebel, Knieper, & Nikitina, 2012).”

    From Collective action in a polycentric water governance system (2018) · cites this paper as Basurto & Ostrom, 2009

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Cited by

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Authors
Basurto, X., & Ostrom, E.
Affiliations
Duke University (US)
ORCID
Basurto, Xavier
Venue
ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Publisher
Franco Angeli
Published
2009-09
Issue
1
Pages
35-60
ISSN
  • 2280-7659 (ISSN-L)
  • 2280-7667
DOI
10.3280/efe2009-001004
OpenAlex
W2140304891
Cited by
180
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 10
FWCI
31.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc-nd
Locations
  • ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (publishedVersion)
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DukeSpace (Duke University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Digital Library Of The Commons Repository (Indiana University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (0601320)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › Coastal and Marine Management
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Marine and fisheries research
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › Sustainable Development and Environmental Management
Keywords
tragedy of the commons, Hardin, self-organization, fisheries, Gulf of California, commons, sustainable development, renewable resources, fishing grounds, social-ecological systems

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