Collective action in a polycentric water governance system

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Vertical coordination may be necessary for political and legal legitimacy.

“This suggests that vertical coordination may also be necessary for political and legal legitimacy (Basurto & Ostrom, 2009;Pahl-Wostl, Lebel, Knieper, & Nikitina, 2012).”

• cites Basurto & Ostrom, 2009 sourceSupported
• cites Pahl-Wostl, Lebel, Knieper, & Nikitina, 2012 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

The CWPs of the Upper Ewaso Ng'iro basin are self-governing and establish their own water distribution rules.

“The CWPs of the Upper Ewaso Ng'iro basin are self-governing, and establish their own water distribution rules (Dell'Angelo et al., 2016;McCord, Dell'Angelo, Baldwin, & Evans, 2017a;McCord, Dell'Angelo, Gower, Caylor, & Evans, 2017b).”

• cites Dell'Angelo et al., 2016 sourceSupported
• cites McCord, Dell'Angelo, Baldwin, & Evans, 2017aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites McCord, Dell'Angelo, Gower, Caylor, & Evans, 2017bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

If upstream users do not adjust their water use during dry periods, there will be insufficient quantities left for downstream CWPs, suggesting that sustainable and equitable water use presents a collective action problem not only within CWPs but between upstream and downstream CWPs.

“If upstream users do not adjust their water use during dry periods, there will be insufficient quantities left for downstream CWPs, suggesting that sustainable and equitable water use presents a collective action problem not only within CWPs but between upstream and downstream CWPs (Dell'Angelo et al., 2016).”

• cites Dell'Angelo et al., 2016 sourcePartly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

WRUAs and WRMA are authorized to resolve within-CWP conflicts, but this is rare and typically occurs only when local authorities cannot resolve disputes.

“WRUAs and WRMA are authorized to resolve within-CWP conflicts, but this is rare and typically occurs only when local authorities cannot resolve disputes.”

May combine two claims.

Between CWPs, WRUAs are authorized to develop locally appropriate conflict resolution procedures, and CWPs commonly turn to WRUAs to resolve between-CWP disputes.

“Between CWPs, WRUAs are authorized to develop locally appropriate conflict resolution procedures, and CWPs commonly turn to WRUAs to resolve between-CWP disputes.”

May combine two claims.

Local Water Bailiffs were authorized to issue permits, monitor use and impose sanctions on illegal users, but chronic underfunding undermined the effectiveness of the program.

“Local Water Bailiffs were authorized to issue permits, monitor use and impose sanctions on illegal users, but chronic underfunding undermined the effectiveness of the program.”

May combine two claims.

WRUAs develop constitutions, by-laws and procedures appropriate to local shared norms and capabilities, but formal WRMA recognition requires including all water users in the catchment area and allowing all members to participate in decision-making.

“WRUAs develop a constitution, by-laws and procedures that are appropriate given local shared norms and capabilities, although to be formally recognized by WRMA, WRUAs must include all water users within the catchment area, and allow all members to participate in decision-making.”

May combine two claims.

WRMA is authorized to issue fines for noncompliance with permit terms, although this authority is rarely exercised.

“WRMA is authorized to issue fines for noncompliance with permit terms, although this authority is rarely exercised.”

May combine two claims.

The national WRMA is authorized to resolve conflicts over illegal water use, but only eight of 25 CWP chairpersons reported that WRMA is a major actor in resolving water conflicts.

“The national WRMA is authorized to resolve conflicts over illegal water use, but only eight of the 25 CWP chairpersons reported that WRMA is a major actor in resolving water conflicts.”

May combine two claims.

Regulatory authority to monitor compliance is available at the WRUA and WRMA levels, but is rarely used.

“Regulatory authority to monitor compliance is available at the WRUA and WRMA levels, but is rarely used.”

May combine two claims.

Water Bailiffs reported chronic water shortages, particularly for downstream users, and violent conflicts over water before reforms.

“Water Bailiffs reported chronic water shortages, particularly for downstream users, and violent conflicts over water.”

May combine two claims.

WRMA officials have broad authority to monitor compliance with CWP rules, WRUA agreements or permit-terms, but rarely exercise this authority.

“At the national level, WRMA officials have broad authority to monitor compliance with CWP rules, WRUA agreements or permit-terms, but rarely exercise this authority.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Before reforms, national water officials had sole formal authority to allocate water via permits.

“Before reforms, national water officials had sole formal authority to allocate water via permits.”

May combine two claims.

Kenya's postreform approach to water governance is deliberately multilevel, with substantial overlap between CWPs, WRUAs and WRMA.

“Kenya's postreform approach to water governance is deliberately multilevel, with substantial overlap between CWPs, WRUAs and WRMA.”

May combine two claims.

Shared membership in WRUAs facilitates social interaction and provides CWPs with a forum for negotiating mutually binding agreements.

“Shared membership in WRUAs facilitates social interaction and provides CWPs with a forum for negotiating mutually binding agreements.”

May combine two claims.

CWP chairpersons sit on WRUA boards; WRUAs hold annual meetings in which CWP representatives share information with WRUA personnel; and additional information is shared between WRUAs and CWPs as needed.

“CWP chairpersons sit on WRUA boards; WRUAs hold annual meetings in which CWP representatives share information with WRUA personnel; and additional information is shared between WRUAs and CWPs as needed-for example, WRUAs sometimes assist CWPs in monitoring for violations of water permits, and are available to resolve water conflicts.”

May combine two claims.

National policy-makers subsequently codified this local innovation into national water regulations, and created formal policies that tend to support local self-governance while providing for greater coordination between local and national policy-makers.

“National policy-makers subsequently codified this local innovation into national water regulations, and have created formal policies that tend to support local self-governance while providing for greater coordination between local and national policy-makers.”

May combine two claims.

A range of formal and informal coordination mechanisms are used in the Kenyan case, including social interactions that provide flexibility and build trust at the local level, and formal regulations that mandate information sharing across levels, provide assurances that actors will comply with rules and ensure local representation in WRUA decision-making.

“A range of formal and informal coordination mechanisms are used in the Kenyan case, including social interactions that provide flexibility and build trust at the local level, as well as formal regulations that mandate information sharing across levels, provide assurances that actors will comply with rules and ensure local representation in WRUA decision-making.”

May combine two claims.

Informal coordination mechanisms are supplemented by formal regulations that require information sharing, ensure CWPs have a voice in WRUA governance, and authorize WRMA to provide local governance functions as needed.

“Informal coordination mechanisms, however, are supplemented by formal regulations that require information sharing, ensure that CWPs must have a voice in WRUA governance and authorize WRMA authorities to provide local governance functions on an as-needed basis.”

May combine two claims.

WRUAs and WRMA routinely communicate; the country's 400-plus WRUAs had all provided national officials with detailed annual reports documenting local conditions and activities.

“Interviews with WRMA revealed that WRUAs and WRMA routinely communicate: the country's 400-plus WRUAs had all provided national officials with detailed annual reports documenting local conditions and activities.”

May combine two claims.

Most CWP representatives see WRUAs as promoting their shared interests, and express a high level of confidence in WRUAs' ability to resolve conflicts between CWPs and help CWPs resolve internal conflicts.

“Surveys, interviews and observations suggest that most CWP representatives see WRUAs as promoting their shared interests, and express a high level of confidence in WRUAs' ability not only to resolve conflicts between CWPs, but also to help CWPs resolve internal conflicts.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Before Kenya's reforms, CWPs and national authorities had limited interaction and few shared interests.

“Before Kenya's reforms, CWPs and national authorities had limited interaction and few shared interests.”

May combine two claims.

The Ewaso Ng'iro region experiences substantial geographic and temporal variation in water availability, where both ecological conditions and upstream users' actions affect local water availability.

“The region experiences substantial geographic and temporal variation in water availability, where both ecological conditions and upstream users' actions affect local water availability.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The region's communities have a tradition of informal governance arrangements at the local level.

“The region's communities also have a tradition of informal governance arrangements at the local level.”

May combine two claims.

The study finds evidence that collective action is occurring in the basin, not only within CWPs but also between CWPs and across multiple governance levels.

“We find evidence that collective action is occurring in the basin, not only within CWPs but also between CWPs and across multiple governance levels.”

May combine two claims.

Resource use is more sustainable, reliable and equitable than in previous years.

“While resource use is more sustainable, reliable and equitable than in previous years”

May combine two claims.

System-wide, gaps in information about water flows and barriers to communication persist.

“Moreover, system-wide, gaps in information about water flows and barriers to communication persist.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Sustainable governance often depends upon interactions between decision centers at multiple levels.

“sustainable governance often depends upon interactions between decision centers at multiple levels.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

Polycentric approaches can undermine effective service provision.

“although other studies come to the opposite conclusion, finding that polycentric approaches can undermine effective service provision (e.g., Lieberman, 2011).”

• cites Lieberman, 2011 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Successful collective action requires a defined group with common interests.

“Core requirements for successful collective action include the presence of a defined group with common interests”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete & Ostrom, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Collective action dilemmas arise when the interests of individuals run counter to the common interests of a group of individuals.

“Collective action dilemmas arise when the interests of individuals run counter to the common interests of a group of individuals (Olson, 1965;Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010).”

• cites Olson, 1965 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010 sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Irrigation governance arrangements that incorporate local actors' concerns, resources and knowledge tend to be more successful than top-down approaches.

“Irrigation governance arrangements that incorporate local actors' concerns, resources and knowledge tend to be more successful than top-down approaches (Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002)”

• cites Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Successful collective action requires incentives and strategies that encourage compliance.

“incentives and strategies that encourage compliance”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete & Ostrom, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Overlapping authority in polycentric systems allows decision centers to take account of each other through cooperation, competition and conflict resolution.

“The overlapping authority in polycentric systems allows decision centers to take account of each other through cooperation, competition and conflict resolution (Ostrom, 2010).”

• cites Ostrom, 2010 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Initial success of Kenya's water reforms has been attributed to factors such as NGO engagement, donor support, and local self-governance.

“Scholars have attributed initial success of these reforms to factors such as nongovernmental organization (NGO) engagement, donor support, and local self-governance (Wiesmann, Gichuki, Kiteme, & Liniger, 2000)”

• cites Wiesmann, Gichuki, Kiteme, & Liniger, 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Successful collective action requires appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms.

“appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete & Ostrom, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Physical geography and environmental features shape the institutional arrangements that govern community water use.

“physical geography and environmental features shape the institutional arrangements that govern community water use”

• cites Araral, 2013aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Araral, 2013bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Trust that others will follow the rules is crucial to collective action.

“Trust that others will follow the rules is crucial to collective action.”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete & Ostrom, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In the past, poor water management in Kenya led to violent conflicts over water.

“In the past, poor water management led to violent conflicts over water (Liniger, Gikonyo, Kiteme, & Wiesmann, 2005).”

• cites Liniger, Gikonyo, Kiteme, & Wiesmann, 2005 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Polycentricity may be particularly useful for natural resource governance that requires collective action among and across user groups at multiple scales and levels of governance.

“Theory predicts that polycentricity may be particularly useful for natural resource governance that requires collective action among and across user groups at multiple scales and levels of governance (McGinnis, 2005).”

• cites McGinnis, 2005Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Polycentric approaches can be more effective than either centralized or decentralized governance approaches.

“Recent scholarship demonstrates that polycentric approaches can be more effective than either centralized or decentralized governance approaches (e.g., Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014)”

• cites Pahl-Wostl & Knieper, 2014 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Collective action requires minimal levels of trust between participants and perceived legitimacy of the process; without these elements participants are unlikely to freely share information or adhere to rules and norms.

“Collective action also requires minimal levels of trust between participants and perceived legitimacy of the process; without these elements participants are unlikely to freely share information or adhere to rules and norms (Ostrom, 1990).”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Accountable local leadership and small group size reduce the costs of face-to-face engagement.

“Other studies point to factors such as accountable local leadership and small group size that reduces the costs of face-to-face engagement (Araral, 2009;Coward, 1977;Lam, 1998;Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994;Siy Jr., 1982;Wade, 1988).”

• cites Araral, 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Coward, 1977 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Lam, 1998Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Polycentric approaches potentially allow local user groups to devise locally appropriate rules, encourage experimentation and learning across jurisdictions, and enable mutual adjustment.

“Potential advantages of polycentric approaches include the ability of local user groups to devise locally appropriate rules (McGinnis & Walker, 2010); the encouragement of experimentation and learning across jurisdictions (Cole, 2015;Ostrom, 2010); and mutual adjustment (Galaz, Crona, Österblom, Olsson, & Folke, 2012;Koontz, Gupta, Mudliar, & Ranjan, 2015).”

• cites McGinnis & Walker, 2010 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Cole, 2015 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Ostrom, 2010 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Successful collective action requires repeated, face-to-face interactions among group members.

“repeated, face-to-face interactions among group members, allowing members to share information and devise appropriate rules and norms”

• cites Ostrom, 1990 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Poteete & Ostrom, 2004 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Polycentric approaches may work well under some conditions but fare poorly in other contexts.

“These conflicting findings suggest that polycentric approaches may work well under some conditions, but fare poorly in other contexts.”

May combine two claims.

Kenya's national-level water reforms initiated in the early 2000s established a polycentric system, with local Community Water Projects sharing overlapping authority over water governance with regional Water Resource Users Associations.

“National-level water reforms initiated in the early 2000s established a polycentric system, with local Community Water Projects (CWPs) sharing overlapping authority over water governance with regional Water Resource Users Associations (WRUAs) to create a deliberately multilevel water governance strategy (Wiesmann, Gichuki, Kiteme, & Liniger, 2000).”

• cites Wiesmann, Gichuki, Kiteme, & Liniger, 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

While overlapping authority may provide decision centers with the opportunity to coordinate, decision centers need adequate incentives or high levels of trust before they will invest in coordinating with other decision centers.

“As such, while overlapping authority may provide decision centers with the opportunity to coordinate, decision centers need adequate incentives or high levels of trust before they will invest in coordinating with other decision centers.”

May combine two claims.

Creation of groups with shared interests is necessary but not sufficient for collective action to occur.

“However, creation of groups with shared interests is necessary but not sufficient for collective action to occur.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Collective action cannot occur without a group of actors who face potential gains from cooperation, along with appropriate incentives and governance structures to encourage cooperation.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Collective action requires that actors have incentives to cooperate, assurance that other actors will also cooperate, minimal trust between participants, and perceived legitimacy of the process.

May combine two claims.

Trust between actors does not provide direct evidence that collective action has occurred, but trust builds legitimacy and increases the likelihood of cooperation across governance levels.

“While trust between actors does not provide direct evidence that collective action has occurred, trust builds legitimacy and increases the likelihood of cooperation across governance levels.”

May combine two claims.

CWPs elect representatives who act as voting members-and even take on leadership roles-within WRUAs.

“CWPs elect representatives who act as voting members-and even take on leadership roles-within WRUAs.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

National WRMA officials announce when the dry season has begun.

“National WRMA officials announce when the dry season has begun.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Collective action may be more difficult during drought periods.

“First, the underlying ecological conditions undoubtedly play a role: collective action may be more difficult during drought periods.”

May combine two claims.

Additional water allocation rules apply during times of water scarcity, dividing authority between actors at multiple levels.

“Additional water allocation rules apply during times of water scarcity, again dividing authority between actors at multiple levels.”

May combine two claims.

The primary coordination mechanism for water allocation is shared WRUA membership, creating a forum for CWPs to negotiate water rationing schedules.

“The primary coordination mechanism for water allocation is shared WRUA membership, creating a forum for CWPs to negotiate water rationing schedules.”

May combine two claims.

WRMA must consult with WRUAs before issuing permits, but has final decision-making authority.

“WRMA must consult with WRUAs before issuing permits, but has final decision-making authority.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Upon announcement of the dry season, CWPs must switch to a reduced water rationing schedule.

“Upon this announcement, CWPs must switch to a reduced water rationing schedule.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Regionally, WRUAs and WRMA have a shared interest in effective permit allocations that enable sustainable and equitable resource use.

“Regionally, WRUAs and WRMA have a shared interest in effective permit allocations that enable sustainable and equitable resource use.”

May combine two claims.

Within a WRUA's jurisdiction, CWPs and WRUA personnel have a shared interest in allocating water equitably across CWPs, which requires information sharing and negotiation.

“Within a WRUA's jurisdiction, CWPs and WRUA personnel have a shared interest in allocating water equitably across CWPs, which requires information sharing and negotiation.”

May combine two claims.

In 2002 Kenya initiated nationwide water reforms that created a polycentric system by institutionalizing water users' groups as autonomous regional decision centers with authority over certain aspects of water governance.

“Based on the success of these groups, in 2002 Kenya initiated nationwide water reforms that created a polycentric system by institutionalizing water users' groups as autonomous regional decision centers with authority over certain aspects of water governance (Baldwin, Washington-Ottombre, Dell'Angelo, Cole, & Evans, 2016).”

• cites Baldwin, Washington-Ottombre, Dell'Angelo, Cole, & Evans, 2016Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: CWPs in the study area experienced chronic water shortages and violent water conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: In response to these conflicts, stakeholders in the basin began to create collaborative groups that brought together CWPs, NGOs, large-scale irrigators, government agencies and other water users to share information and resolve conflicts.

May combine two claims.

Increased capacity at all levels enables collective action, but is not the only driver.

“Increased capacity at all levels enables collective action, but is not the only driver.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Since the reforms, Kenya has experienced significant economic growth, an increasingly professional public sector, and additional financial and capacity-building support from donors and NGOs.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Polycentricity scholars have theorized that conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary to settle disputes that may arise within or between autonomous decision centers in polycentric systems.

“Polycentricity scholars have theorized that conflict resolution mechanisms are necessary to settle disputes that may arise within or between autonomous decision centers in polycentric systems (Marshall, 2013).”

• cites Marshall, 2013 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Effective coordination is not automatic in polycentric systems, and poor coordination can undermine trust and reduce legitimacy.

“Effective coordination is not automatic in polycentric systems (Lieberman, 2011;Pahl-Wostl, 2009), and poor coordination can undermine trust and reduce legitimacy.”

• cites Lieberman, 2011 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Pahl-Wostl, 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Actors coordinate primarily through shared membership and mutually binding agreements, although these forms of coordination are also bolstered by regulatory requirements for inclusion and participation.

“Actors thus coordinate primarily through shared membership and mutually binding agreements, although these forms of coordination are also bolstered by regulatory requirements for inclusion and participation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Within CWPs, members have a shared interest in equitable and sustainable water governance.

“Within CWPs, members have a shared interest in equitable and sustainable water governance.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Under divergent social and ecological conditions, polycentric governance might be less suitable.

“Under divergent social and ecological conditions, polycentric governance might be less suitable.”

May combine two claims.

The case study provides overwhelming evidence that coordination has improved since the reforms were first enacted, but improvement does not necessarily imply resolution of all problems.

“Thus, while our case study provides overwhelming evidence that coordination has improved since the reforms were first enacted, it also illustrates that improvement does not necessarily imply the resolution of all problems.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The literature on collective action emphasizes the importance of institutional arrangements well-suited to local ecological and social conditions.

“The literature on collective action emphasizes the importance of institutional arrangements that are wellsuited to local ecological and social conditions (e.g.Araral, 2013a, 2013b).”

• cites Araral, 2013aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Araral, 2013bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The creation of WRUAs establishes overlapping authority across governance levels, and in doing so creates identifiable groups of actors with shared interest in effective water governance in the Upper Ewaso Ng'iro basin.

“The creation of WRUAs establishes overlapping authority across governance levels, and in doing so creates identifiable groups of actors with shared interest in effective water governance in the Upper Ewaso Ng'iro basin.”