The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond
Open accessAbstract
This paper reviews our understanding of the growing open source movement.We highlight how many aspects of open source software appear initially puzzling to an economist.As we have acknowledge, our ability to answer confidently many of the issues raised here questions is likely to increase as the open source movement itself grows and evolves.At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary.The labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.
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Open Source Software is produced in a completely different way than other commercial products: workers are usually unpaid, management and direction are limited, and legal restrictions on using the product are modest.
“Open Source Software, which burst on the innovation scene in the mid-1990s, is produced in a completely different way than other commercial products. Workers are usually unpaid; management and direction are limited; and legal restrictions on using the product are modest (Lerner and Tirole, 2004).”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
The Abstract (page unavailable) contrasts open-source production with private firms and describes contributors as often unpaid and projects as loosely structured. It says many contributors are unpaid, not that workers are usually unpaid. The Abstract and “How Does The Legal System Affect Open Source?” (page unavailable) also describe conditions on use and licenses that vary in restrictiveness, so they do not establish that legal restrictions are generally modest. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAdopting a single, industry-wide open source standard increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions.
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
The section “What is the Relative Quality of Open Source Software?” (page unavailable) discusses open source programmers identifying bugs and users adapting code. “What Motivates Open Source Contributors?” (page unavailable) says projects may attract more programmers when programmers expect others to participate. Neither passage establishes that adopting a single industry-wide standard increases the number submitting bug reports and extensions. (LLM, conf=0.75)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAdopting a single, industry-wide open source standard avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons.'
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
The ‘Can Open Source Work Beyond Software?’ section says open source can protect users against future price increases, supporting a narrower claim about avoiding hold-up. But it attributes avoidance of patent thickets to patent pools, not to adopting an industry-wide open-source standard. The discussion of software patents also says open-source projects remain vulnerable to patent claims; it does not establish that such a standard avoids anticommons costs. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAdopting a single, industry-wide open source standard fosters a common pool of skilled workers.
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
In “What Motivates Open Source Contributors?” (page not supplied), the paper says freely available code can be used for learning, making it familiar to programmers through an “alumni effect.” That supports the idea of workers with shared skills, but the paper does not say that adopting a single industry-wide standard creates a common pool of skilled workers. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredCorporations can commit to keep code in the public domain or to highlight individual contributions by surrendering control to outside leaders.
“For example, corporations can commit to keep code in the public domain or to highlight individual contributions by surrendering control to outside leaders (Lerner and Tirole, 2004).”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning.
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
From Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm (2006) · cites this paper as Lerner and Tirole, 2004
The Final Thoughts section notes that open-source projects can duplicate work because of poor coordination, but it does not say that adopting a single industry-wide standard reduces costs from unnecessary versioning. Searches for versioning, incompatible versions, and standardization found no passage in our copy establishing that specific claim; the retrieved passages have no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.72)
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Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172 · see citing works
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Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm
Maurer, S., & Scotchmer, S. (2006) · NBER Working Paper No. 12148 · doi:10.3386/w12148 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
- Authors
- Lerner, J., & Tirole, J.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- ORCID
- Lerner, Josh
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2004-12
- OpenAlex
- W3121659186
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- public-domain
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Microsoft
- Harvard Business School
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Copyright and Intellectual Property
- Keywords
- open source software, technology sharing, open source contributors, industrial organization, labor economics, economics of knowledge
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