The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis
Open accessAbstract
While the potential for intellectual property rights to inhibit the diffusion of scientific knowledge is at the heart of several contemporary policy debates, evidence for the "anti-commons effect" has been anecdotal.A central issue in this debate is how intellectual property rights over a given piece of knowledge affects the propensity of future researchers to build upon that knowledge in their own scientific research activities.This article frames this debate around the concept of dual knowledge, in which a single discovery may contribute to both scientific research and useful commercial applications.A key implication of dual knowledge is that it may be simultaneously instantiated as a scientific research article and as a patent.Such patent-paper pairs are at the heart of our empirical strategy.We exploit the fact that patents are granted with a substantial lag, often many years after the knowledge is initially disclosed through paper publication.The knowledge associated with a patent paper pair therefore diffuses within two distinct intellectual property environments -one associated with the pre-grant period and another after formal IP rights are granted.Relative to the expected citation pattern for publications with a given quality level, anticommons theory predicts that the citation rate to a scientific publication should fall after formal IP rights associated with that publication are granted.Employing a differencesindifferences estimator for 169 patent-paper pairs (and including a control group of publications from the same journal for which no patent is granted), we find evidence for a modest anticommons effect (the citation rate after the patent grant declines by between 9 and 17%).This decline becomes more pronounced with the number of years elapsed since the date of the patent grant, and is particularly salient for articles authored by researchers with public sector affiliations.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Endogenous Technological Change
Romer, P. M. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261725 · Cited by 17,711
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R., & Griliches, Z. (1987) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534454 · Cited by 3,772
Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship
Hausman, J., Hall, B. H., & Griliches, Z. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911191 · Cited by 3,393
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research
Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. S. (1998) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.280.5364.698 · Cited by 2,572
Hall, B. H., & Ziedonis, R. H. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696400 · Cited by 2,246
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention
Arrow, K. J. (1972) · Readings in Industrial Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_13 · Cited by 1,842
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting
Shapiro, C. (2000) · Innovation Policy and the Economy · doi:10.1086/ipe.1.25056143 · Cited by 1,510
Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R., Sampat, B. N., & Ziedonis, A. A. (2001) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(99)00100-6 · Cited by 1,422
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets
Heller, M. A. (1998) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1342203 · Cited by 1,343
The norms of entrepreneurial science: cognitive effects of the new university–industry linkages
Etzkowitz, H. (1998) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(98)00093-6 · Cited by 1,279
Absorptive Capacity, Coauthoring Behavior, and the Organization of Research in Drug Discovery
Cockburn, I. M., & Henderson, R. M. (1998) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00067 · Cited by 1,197
Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions
Jensen, R., & Thursby, M. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.240 · Cited by 1,159
7. Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression Models
Allison, P. D., & Waterman, R. P. (2002) · Sociological Methodology · doi:10.1111/1467-9531.00117 · Cited by 1,029
Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT
Agrawal, A., & Henderson, R. (2002) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.48.1.44.14279 · Cited by 1,017
Fundamental Stocks of Knowledge and Productivity Growth
Adams, J. D. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261702 · Cited by 704
Relationships between Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences — An Industry Survey
Blumenthal, D., Causino, N., Campbell, E., & Louis, K. S. (1996) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejm199602083340606 · Cited by 401
Continuous cultures of fused cells secreting antibody of predefined specificity. 1975.
Köhler, G., & Milstein, C. (2005) · PubMed · Cited by 354
Eisenberg, R. S. (1996) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073686 · Cited by 341
On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions
Merges, R. P., & Nelson, R. R. (1994) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90083-3 · Cited by 324
The Private Science of Louis Pasteur
Geison, G. L. (1996) · doi:10.1515/9781400864089 · Cited by 284
Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property
Weitzman, M. L. (1974) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(74)90015-5 · Cited by 215
Status report: Linkage between technology and science
Narin, F., & Olivastro, D. (1992) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/0048-7333(92)90018-y · Cited by 202
The emergence of biotechnology: institutions and markets in industrial innovation
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-1514 · Cited by 193
Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation
Kremer, M. (2002) · Entrepreneurial Economics · doi:10.1093/oso/9780195150285.003.0013 · Cited by 167
Mapping signal transduction pathways by phage display
Zozulya, S., Lioubin, M. N., Hill, R. J., Abram, C. L., & Gishizky, M. L. (1999) · Nature Biotechnology · doi:10.1038/70736 · Cited by 78
Commercializing the laboratory: the relationship between faculty patenting and publishingPreprint
Fabrizio, K. R., & Minin, A. D. (2004) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 55
The Impact of Academic Patenting on (Public) Research Output
Azoulay, P., Ding, W. W., & Stuart, T. E. (2009) · Cited by 28
Cited by
Perkmann, M., Tartari, V., McKelvey, M., Autio, E., Broström, A., D’Este, P., Fini, R., Geuna, A., Grimaldi, R., Hughes, A., et al. (2013) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.09.007 · Cited by 2,552
Why do academics engage with industry? The entrepreneurial university and individual motivations
D’Este, P., & Perkmann, M. (2011) · The Journal of Technology Transfer · doi:10.1007/s10961-010-9153-z · Cited by 1,036
Building Dynamic Capabilities: Innovation Driven by Individual-, Firm-, and Network-Level Effects
Rothaermel, F. T., & Hess, A. M. (2007) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0291 · Cited by 979
Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists?
Stern, S. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0241 · Cited by 748
Self-citationRecent Research on the Economics of Patents
Hall, B. H., & Harhoff, D. (2012) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111008 · Cited by 548
Metadata
- Authors
- Murray, F., & Stern, S.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2005-07
- OpenAlex
- W3021438493
- Cited by
- 651
- References
- 27
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.