The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulation and Distrust
Open accessAbstract
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.
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Cites
Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.38-2454 · Cited by 28,789
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Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
Schneider, P. A., & Fukuyama, F. (1996) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251846 · Cited by 10,501
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
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Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nonetti, R. Y. (1994) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctt7s8r7 · Cited by 5,580
The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963) · Cited by 4,055
Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3664 · Cited by 4,014
Cited by
The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa
Nunn, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.3221 · Cited by 2,197
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility
LIANG, H., & RENNEBOOG, L. (2017) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12487 · Cited by 1,381
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2060 · Cited by 1,286
Self-citationJohnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 · Cited by 955
Metadata
- Authors
- Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., & Shleifer, A.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2009-01
- OpenAlex
- W2167902785
- Cited by
- 509
- References
- 62
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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