The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance-of-Payments Crises
Open accessAbstract
The recent balance-of-payments literature shows that speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur if the path of the rate is riot to offer abnormal profit opportunities.Such attacks are fully rational, as they reflect the market's response to a regime breakdown that is inevitable.This paper shows that, given certain expectations about policy, balance-of--payments crises can also be purely self-fulfilling events.In such cases even a permanently viable regime may break down, and the economy will possess multiple equilibria corresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability of collapse.The behavior of domestic interest rates and foreign reserves will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack.Work on foreign-exchange crises derives from the naturalresource literature initiated by Salant and Henderson (1978), where the definition of "abnormal" profit opportunities is straightforward.Because the definition is not always straightforward in a monetary context, this paper also shows how crises occur in a discrete-time stochastic monetary model when an eventual breakdown is inevitable.
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Cites
A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises
Krugman, P. (1979) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1991793 · Cited by 2,904
Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1985) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(85)90036-7 · Cited by 1,150
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (2000) · Quarterly Review · doi:10.21034/qr.2412 · Cited by 612
Speculative bubbles, crashes and rational expectations
Blanchard, O. J. (1979) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(79)90017-x · Cited by 530
Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold
Salant, S. W., & Henderson, D. W. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260702 · Cited by 434
Speculative Hyperinflations in Maximizing Models: Can We Rule Them Out?
Obstfeld, M., & Rogoff, K. (1982) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0855 · Cited by 251
Self-citationThe Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Attack
Salant, S. W. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261127 · Cited by 176
Cited by
Contagious Currency Crises: First Tests
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., & Wyplosz, C. (1996) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440879 · Cited by 843
Bekaert, G., & Harvey, C. R. (2003) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/s0927-5398(02)00054-3 · Cited by 754
Financial Intermediaries and Markets
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00525.x · Cited by 753
Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Edmond, C. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt020 · Cited by 433
Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility
Angeletos, G.-M., & Werning, I. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1720 · Cited by 317
Metadata
- Authors
- Obstfeld, M.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1984-11
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 72-81
- OpenAlex
- W1484599272
- Cited by
- 946
- References
- 7
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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