Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
Abstract
This article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change. There is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium's comparative statics. Holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens, if the per-unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow. In contrast, if the number of signals increases, so that both total signal precision and the regime's costs of manipulation rise together, then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control.
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Empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats.
“While some theoretical work suggests that the internet may impede non-democratic rule (Edmond, 2013), empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).”
From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Edmond, 2013
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“At the beginning of the game, each member of the population, i , learns his or her type (cid:1) i = (cid:1) + (cid:2) i , which I interpret as his or her level of antigovern-ment sentiment.”
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How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information
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How much should we trust the dictator’s GDP growth estimates?
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Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état
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“Edmond (2013) develops a model of information manipulation and political regime change.”
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Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205 · see citing works
Communication Technology and Protest
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Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
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“The question of how such manipulation could be effective is addressed by Edmond (2013).”
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“The Internet, social media, and mobile platforms allow individuals to act as broadcasters and disseminate information on a much larger scale (Diamond 2010; Earl and Kimport 2011; Edmond 2013; Ferdinand 2000).”
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Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement*
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“Edmond (2013, 1425) writes simply that “the more citizens participate in [a protest], the more likely it is that the regime is overthrown and so the more likely it is that any individual also participates.””
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“Edmond (2013), Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2015b), Lorentzen (2014), and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) all consider environments in which elites manipulate or censor information in the shadow of the threat of unrest.”
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Steinert-Threlkeld, Z. C., Mocanu, D., Vespignani, A., & Fowler, J. (2015) · EPJ Data Science · doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-015-0056-y · Cited by 165 · see citing works
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A theory of informational autocracyPreprint
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“…censor public communication and ban demonstrations (Kricheli et al. 2011); block private messages that encourage anti-regime action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013); exaggerate their strength (Edmond 2013, Huang 2014); or use both censorship and propaganda to hinder coordination (Chen and Xu 2015).”
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Meng, T.-G., Pan, J., & Yang, P. (2017) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014556212 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
“has the potential to increase coordination among opponents to autocratic regimes (Aday et al., 2012; Bellin, 2012; Edmond, 2012; Lorentzen, 2013).”
BackgroundInfluentialElections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
Little, A. T. (2012) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00011078 · Cited by 160 · see citing works
“The notion that incumbent leaders, particularly dictators, attempt to manipulate the information available to citizens is also modeled with a global games framework in Edmond (2008) and Egorov and Sonin (2011).”
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Resilience to Online Censorship
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Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination
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“Edmond (2013) studies a different kind of policy interventions: interventions that can manipulate the information that is available to the agents, without however directly signaling information to them.”
How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay
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“While some theoretical work suggests that the internet may impede non-democratic rule (Edmond, 2013), empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).”
BackgroundDeliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud
Rundlett, A., & Svolik, M. W. (2016) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055415000635 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
“The aggregate amount of fraud will 9 See Boix and Svolik (2013), Bueno de Mesquita (2010), Edmond (2013), Little (2012), and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011) for applications of global games and related techniques to the analysis of collective action problems in protests, repression, regime change,…”
BackgroundWho Matters in Coordination Problems
Sákovics, J., & Steiner, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3439 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
“The following corollary of the belief constraint states the approximate relation (4) formally.”
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Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2015) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w21136 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
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The unintended consequences of internet diffusion: Evidence from Malaysia
Miner, L. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.10.002 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
“Geography has been used to identify the effects of dams (Duflo and Pande, 2007); electrification (Dinkelman, 2012; Barham, Lipscomb, and Mobarak, 2011); social capital (Olken, 2009; Paluck, 2009); ethnic violence (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2010); and the long-term effects of slavery Nunn (2008); Nunn and Puga (2009).”
MethodPersistent Political Engagement: Social Interactions and the Dynamics of Protest Movements
Bursztyn, L., Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2021) · American Economic Review: Insights · doi:10.1257/aeri.20200261 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates
Zakharov, A. (2016) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/684365 · Cited by 108 · see citing works
“The other first-order condition (16) becomes”
China's Media Censorship: A Dynamic and Diversified Regime
Tai, Q. (2014) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/s1598240800008900 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Little, A. (2017) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.006 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919–2008
Ponticelli, J., & Voth, H. (2020) · Journal of comparative economics (Print) · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2019.09.007 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Elections, Protest, and Alternation of Power
Little, A. T., Tucker, J. A., & LaGatta, T. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/682569 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
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Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes*
Chen, J.-D., & Xu, Y. (2015) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2015.21 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
“The government ’ s equilibrium strategies consist of manipulating released information ε * 2 ½ 0 ; 1 (cid:4) , and choosing a probability of reform σ * ( θ , s )”
BackgroundThe Strategy of Manipulating Conflict
Baliga, S., & Sjöström, T. (2012) · doi:10.1257/aer.102.6.2897 · Cited by 89
“Edmond (2008) considers a global game where citizens can overthrow a dictator by coordinating on a revolution, but the dictator increases his chances of survival by jamming the citizens’ signals about how likely it is that a revolution will succeed.”
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Brummitt, C. D., Barnett, G., & D’Souza, R. M. (2015) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2015.0712 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
“similar to System 1 in that they also permit multiple equilibria (but they lack dynamics). Global gameshavebeenappliedtocurrencycrises[62],debt crises[63,18],bankruns[31,72],andriotsandpoliticalchange[5,23];moreover,contagionhasbeenstudied in generalizations of these models, such as currencycrisestriggeringcurrencycri…”
BackgroundElites Tweet to Get Feet Off the Streets: Measuring Regime Social Media Strategies During Protest
Munger, K., Bonneau, R., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. A. (2019) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.3 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Media, Protest Diffusion, and Authoritarian Resilience
Huang, H.-F., Boranbay-Akan, S., & Huang, L.-Y. (2016) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2016.25 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
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Authoritarianism Online: What Can We Learn from Internet Data in Nondemocracies?
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The Dictator's Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes
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A Model of Protests, Revolution, and InformationPreprint
Barberà, S., & Jackson, M. O. (2020) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2732864 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard
Dragu, T., & Przeworski, A. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055418000552 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
“Autocrats can coopt some potential opponents (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), engage in propaganda (Chen andXu 2017; Edmond 2013; Little 2017), engineer elections to legitimize their power (Cox 2009; Gandhi and LustOkar 2009), or manufacture the semblance of a civil…”
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Collective action in networks: Evidence from the Chilean student movement
González, F. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104220 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
“1See Olson (1965), Tullock (1971), Granovetter (1978), Ti Lohmann (1993), Marwell and Oliver (1993), Chwe (200 Edmond (2013), Little (2016), and Barbera and Jackson (2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104220 0047-2727/© 2020 Elsevier B.V.”
InfluentialCredit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments
Goldstein, I., & Huang, C. (2020) · Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12961 · Cited by 60
“…model the signaling effects of the government’s preemptive defensive policies, which pools very strong governments and very weak governments together, and Edmond (2013) considers a dictator’s costly private information manipulation, where all revolutionaries’ interim beliefs have full support.”
Bayesian Persuasion in Coordination Games
Goldstein, I., & Huang, C. (2016) · doi:10.1257/aer.p20161047 · Cited by 60
Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
Angeletos, G., & Pavan, A. (2013) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1156 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
Repression in the Digital Age: Surveillance, Censorship, and the Dynamics of State Violence
Gohdes, A. R. (2024) · Oxford University Press · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197743577.001.0001 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Loeper, A., Steiner, J., & Stewart, C. (2013) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12100 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“The literature on social movements has extensively analysed the informational role of groups which are organised, and therefore internalise the impact of information they provide to the broader public (Bueno De Mesquita, 2010; Edmond, 2013).”
News media and delegated information choice
Nimark, K. P., & Pitschner, S. (2019) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.001 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Les déterminants de la mobilisation des Gilets jaunes
Boyer, P. C., Delemotte, T., Gauthier, G., Rollet, V., & Schmutz, B. (2020) · Revue économique · doi:10.3917/reco.711.0109 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
“…"Occupy Wall Street" en 2011, "La Manif pour tous" en 2012, "Nuit Debout" en 2016, etc. 1 De récents travaux théoriques ont souligné l'importance potentielle des réseaux sociaux dans l'émergence de mouvements de protestation de grande ampleur (Edmond, 2013, Little, 2016, Barbera & Jackson, 2018).”
BackgroundCensorship as Optimal Persuasion
Kolotilin, A., Mylovanov, T., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3501474 · Cited by 55
“7In different contexts, media control by a government has also been studied by Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009), Edmond (2013), and Lorentzen (2014). See also the overview of the literature on media capture, slant, and transparency in Prat and Strömberg (2013). 8This assumption is made for clarity of exposition.”
InfluentialThe Political Economics of Non-democracyPreprint
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3706331 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“In Edmond (2013), the dictator has a costly technology to jam the signal available to citizens who might want to protest.”
Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers
Treisman, D. (2020) · Annual review of political science (Palo Alto, Calif. Print) · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“Coordination matters because, given the risk of punishment, citizens will only revolt if they believe many others will join them (see, e.g., Kuran 1991, Edmond 2013).”
Tyson, S. A., & Smith, A. (2018) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/693986 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions PubliclyPreprint
Chen, J.-D., & Xu, Y. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2318051 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Information quality and crises in regime-change games
Iachan, F. S., & Nenov, P. (2015) · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005 · Cited by 44
“…of equilibria.2 In our setting, the noisy information structure is more than a device used 1Beyond crisis modeling, regime-change games have been extensively used in other contexts, for example, to understand issues in investment (Dasgupta, 2007) and political change (Edmond, 2013), among others.”
BackgroundMethodInformation acquisition in global games of regime change
Szkup, M., & Treviño, I. (2015) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.005 · Cited by 43
“Global games have been extensively applied to model economic phenomena featuring coordination problems, such as currency crises (Morris and Shin, 1998), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), FDI decisions (Dasgupta, 2007), and political revolts (Edmond, 2013).”
BackgroundMethodInformational Channels of Financial Contagion
Treviño, I. (2020) · doi:10.3982/ecta15604 · Cited by 43
“For applications and extensions of global games models see, among others, Morris and Shin (1998, 2004), Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006, 2007), Angeletos and Werning (2006), Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006), or Edmond (2013).”
Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare Events and Crisis Contagion
Chen, H., & Suen, W. C. (2016) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20140147 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
“The framework has been adapted to model political regime changes (Edmond 2013; Chen, Lu, and Suen 2014) and bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005).”
MethodProtests and trust in the state: Evidence from African countries
Sangnier, M., & Zylberberg, Y. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.05.005 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
A Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity
Kets, W., & Sandroni, A. (2020) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdaa037 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
How Chinese Officials Use the Internet to Construct Their Public Image
Pan, J. (2017) · Political Science Research and Methods · doi:10.1017/psrm.2017.15 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
The Great Moderation in International Capital Flows: A Global Phenomenon?
McQuade, P. D., & Schmitz, M. (2016) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2017.02.027 · Cited by 39
Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games
Morris, S., Oyama, D., & Takahashi, S. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3697335 · Cited by 38
“(2)While we present our results in terms of abstract BAS games, such games have been used in applied settings, such as currency attacks (Morris and Shin (1998)), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)), political revolutions (Edmond (2013)), and contracting with externalities (Winter (2004)), among many others.”
MethodSocial Connectedness and Local Contagion
Leister, C., Zenou, Y., & Zhou, J.-J. (2021) · doi:10.1093/restud/rdab022 · Cited by 35
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2020) · Economic Journal · doi:10.1093/ej/ueaa123 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies
Gratton, G., & Lee, B. E. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3704156 · Cited by 35
A Wake-Up Call: Information Contagion and Strategic UncertaintyPreprint
Ahnert, T., & Bertsch, C. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2364405 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
“whether or not to attempt a revolution themselves (see Edmond [15]).”
Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes: A Critique
Przeworski, A. (2022) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592722002067 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Aspiring for Change: A Theory of Middle Class Activism
Chen, H., & Suen, W. (2017) · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12346 · Cited by 33
“In Morris and Shin (1998) and later studies, such as Chen, Lu, and Suen (2014) and Edmond (2013), agents are uncertain about the fundamen-”
BackgroundPropaganda, Presumed Influence, and Collective Protest
Huang, H.-F., & Cruz, N. J. (2021) · Political Behavior · doi:10.1007/s11109-021-09683-0 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
“2016; Bueno De Mesquita 2010; Edmond 2013).”
InfluentialReporting Choices in the Shadow of Bank Runs
Gao, P.-Y., & Jiang, X. (2017) · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.005 · Cited by 32
“The pooling equilibrium in Edmond (2013) results from the noise in creditors’ signals.”
InfluentialBUENO DE MESQUITA, E., & TYSON, S. A. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000911 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
History as a coordination device
Argenziano, R., & Gilboa, I. (2011) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9264-5 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
“More recently, Edmond (2008) studied information manipulation in games of regime change, whereas Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2007) focus on a learning process by which individuals playing such games form beliefs.”
BackgroundA Wake-Up Call Theory of Contagion
Ahnert, T., & Bertsch, C. (2022) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4100188 · Cited by 30
“Szkup and Trevino 4See Glick and Rose (1999) for the role of trade links, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, 2003) for financial links, and Dasgupta et al.”
BackgroundInternational Pressure, State Repression, and the Spread of Protest
Shadmehr, M., & Boleslavsky, R. (2021) · Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714763 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
“…2010, 2013; Morris and Shadmehr 2017; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2019; Wantchékon and García-Ponce 2014), the role of media (Barbera and Jackson 2020; Edmond 2013; Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Guriev and Treisman 2020; Huang, Boranbay, and Huang 2019; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015), the effect of…”
BackgroundMorris, S., & Shadmehr, M. (2020) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.33774/apsa-2020-ngmjv · Cited by 29
“Our paper builds on the literature on global games in general, and applications in political economy in particular (Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Edmond 2013; Chen and Suen 2016; Egorov and Sonin 2017; Shadmehr 2017; Tyson and Smith 2018).”
MethodIncumbent policy, benefits provision, and the triggering and spread of revolutionary uprisings
Hausken, K., & Ncube, M. Z. (2017) · The Economics of Peace and Security Journal · doi:10.15355/epsj.12.1.54 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“Revolutionaries’ skills: See Casper and Tyson (2014) for elite coordination and popular protest in a coup d’ etat, and Edmond (2013) for information manipulation, coordination, and regime change.”
Background
- Authors
- Edmond, C.
- Affiliations
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Edmond, Chris
- ORCID
- Edmond, Chris
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-07-04
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1422-1458
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3123860814
- Cited by
- 433
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 36.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- information manipulation, regime change, propaganda, rebellion, coordination games, imperfect information, signal precision, equilibrium characterization, comparative statics, economies of scale
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