Cited by 433Game Theory and ApplicationsPolitical Conflict and GovernanceMedia Influence and Politics

Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*

Edmond, Chris·2013·The Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

This article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change. There is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium's comparative statics. Holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens, if the per-unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow. In contrast, if the number of signals increases, so that both total signal precision and the regime's costs of manipulation rise together, then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control.

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Crossref · 10.1093/restud/rdt020

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  • Empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats.

    “While some theoretical work suggests that the internet may impede non-democratic rule (Edmond, 2013), empirical research provides tentative support for cyber-pessimists who claim that the internet plays into the hands of autocrats (Rød & Weidmann, 2015).”

    From How Dictators Control the Internet: A Review Essay (2020) · cites this paper as Edmond, 2013

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Authors
Edmond, C.
Affiliations
The University of Melbourne (AU)
Corresponding author
Edmond, Chris
Venue
The Review of Economic Studies
Published
2013-07-04
Volume
80
Issue
4
Pages
1422-1458
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W3123860814
Cited by
433
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 27 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 73 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 30 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 33 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 3
FWCI
36.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
information manipulation, regime change, propaganda, rebellion, coordination games, imperfect information, signal precision, equilibrium characterization, comparative statics, economies of scale

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