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The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review

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Saez, Emmanuel, Slemrod, Joel, Giertz, Seth · 2009 · National Bureau of Economic Research

Abstract

This paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates (ETI) using tax return data.First, we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis.We discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic.Second, we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the United States to illustrate those issues.Third, we provide a critical discussion of most of the taxable income elasticities studies to date, both in the United States and abroad, in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out.Finally, we discuss avenues for future research.

Overview

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TL;DR

This paper critically reviews the literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) with respect to marginal tax rates, providing a theoretical framework and an empirical identification critique. It concludes that the ETI is not always a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis and that convincing long-run estimates are lacking, while most reliable longer-run estimates range from 0.12 to 0.4.

Key findings

  • Under certain assumptions, the ETI captures all behavioral responses to marginal tax rates and can serve as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis; however, fiscal externalities from income shifting across tax bases or time, and classical externalities, require additional parameters and can invalidate that sufficiency.
  • Empirical estimates vary widely: early U.S. studies around 1981 and 1986 produced large elasticities (e.g., Lindsey’s core estimates 1.6–1.8; Feldstein 1995 estimates 1 to 3), but later estimates are lower, and “the most reliable longer-run estimates range from 0.12 to 0.4.”
  • The ETI is higher for high-income taxpayers and is not an immutable parameter; it depends on tax base breadth and enforcement. In the paper’s illustrative calculation with \(a=1.60\) and \(e=0.5\), a slight top-rate increase loses 43.1% of mechanical revenue to behavioral responses, implying a marginal efficiency cost of funds of $1.76 per $1 raised and a revenue-maximizing top rate of 55.6%; if half the response shifts to a base taxed at \(t=0.3\), the revenue loss falls to 25%, marginal excess burden to 32%, and the revenue-maximizing rate rises to 62.2%.
  • In the 1993 top-rate increase illustration, repeated cross-section estimates for 1992–1993 are about 0.998, while panel estimates are about 1.395; estimates are highly sensitive to year choice, control group, base-year income controls, and instrument choice, with some specifications yielding negative or much smaller elasticities.

Methods

  • Critical survey and theoretical synthesis: the paper derives the ETI framework, formulas for revenue effects, marginal excess burden, and revenue-maximizing tax rates, and discusses fiscal externalities, tax base definition, evasion, and classical externalities.
  • Empirical illustration: uses the 1993 U.S. top individual income tax rate increase (top rate from 31% to 36% or 39.6%) with the Treasury panel of tax returns described in Giertz (2008c); treatment group is the top 1%, control group is the next 9% or next 49%; estimates use 2SLS difference-in-differences, repeated cross-section, and panel specifications over 1991–1997.
  • Literature review: covers U.S. studies based on legislated tax changes, unlegislated variation such as bracket creep and kink-point bunching, and studies for other countries including the U.K., Denmark, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Poland, Russia, and New Zealand.

Limitations

  • The paper states that there are “no convincing estimates of the long-run elasticity of reported taxable income to changes in the marginal tax rate,” and that identification is plagued by non-tax income inequality trends, mean reversion, tax base changes, fiscal externalities, and short-term versus long-term response issues.
  • The paper states that two-year panel analyses cannot adequately control for mean reversion or income inequality changes without compromising identification, and that estimates are highly sensitive to specification, control group, instrument, and base-year income controls.
  • Evident from the text: many reviewed studies exclude capital gains, use short panels, or rely on data with limited access or blurred top incomes; the paper also notes that the ETI’s welfare relevance depends on the anatomy of behavioral responses and on externalities, so the standard ETI alone may misstate efficiency costs.

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Crossref · 10.3386/w15012

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Atkinson, Anthony and Thomas Piketty. 2007. Top Incomes over the Twentieth Cen- tury. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 585 pp.
  2. Auten, Gerald and Robert Carroll. 1995. "Behavior of the Affluent and the 1986 Tax Reform Act." in Proceedings of the 87th Annual Conference on Taxation of the National Tax Association, Columbus, Ohio, 70-76.
  3. Clotfelter, Charles and Richard Schmalbeck. 1996. "The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on Nonprofit Organizations." in Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, Henry Aaron and William Gale, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 211-46.
  4. Diamond, Peter and James Mirrlees. 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency and II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, 61: 8-27 and 261-278.
  5. Feenberg, Daniel and Elisabeth Coutts. 1993. "An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 12(1): 189-194.
  6. Fullerton, Don. 1996. "Comment on 'High-Income Families and the Tax Changes of the 1980s: The Anatomy of Behavioral Response'." in Martin Feldstein and James Poterba, eds., Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  7. Alan Viard, AEI Press, Washington, D.C.: 101-136.
  8. Mirrlees, James. 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation." Review of Economic Studies, 38: 175-208.
  9. Munnell, Alicia, ed. (1987) Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series 30.
  10. Navratil, John. "The Economic Recovery Act of 1981." In Essays on the Impact of Marginal Tax Rate Reductions on the Reporting of Taxable Income on Individual Tax Returns, Doctoral Dissertation (Chapter 1), Harvard University, 1995.
  11. Navratil, John. "The Tax Reform Act of 1986: New Evidence on Individual Taxpayer Behavior from Panel Tax Return Data." In Essays on the Impact of Marginal Tax Rate Re- ductions on the Reporting of Taxable Income on Individual Tax Returns, Doctoral Dissertation (Chapter 3), Harvard University, 1995.
  12. Slemrod, Joel and Jon Bakija. 2001. "Growing Inequality and Decreased Tax Progressiv- ity." in Kevin Hassett, ed., Inequality and Tax Policy, Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute Press.

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Metadata

Authors
Saez, E., Slemrod, J., & Giertz, S.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
  • University of Michigan (US)
  • University of Nebraska–Lincoln (US)
Venue
National Bureau of Economic Research
Published
2009-05
OpenAlex
W3121950409
Cited by
168
References
96
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 27
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Lincoln (University of Nebraska) (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (0134946)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Keywords
elasticity of taxable income, marginal tax rates, tax return data, sufficient statistics, optimal taxation, tax efficiency, personal income tax

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