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Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation
Open accessAbstract
We study the role of firm-and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation.We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay.We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias.Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies).Finally, the method used in the paper has a number of potential applications in financial economics.
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Cites
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
CEO Compensation and Board Structure
CHHAOCHHARIA, V., & GRINSTEIN, Y. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01433.x · Cited by 611
Cited by
Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity
Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht047 · Cited by 1,151
Executive compensation and corporate governance in China
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006 · Cited by 592
Corporate Policies of Republican Managers
Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. (2014) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109014000702 · Cited by 425
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs131 · Cited by 422
CEO Materialism and Corporate Social Responsibility
Davidson, R. H., Dey, A., & Smith, A. J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2794099 · Cited by 291
Metadata
- Authors
- Graham, J., Li, S., & Qiu, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2011-08
- OpenAlex
- W2152840954
- Cited by
- 202
- References
- 2
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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